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INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we describe the evolution of earnings and employ-
ment, postdisplacement and post-other-separation, for workers in
France and Germany.  Although the literature on displaced workers
(those who experienced involuntary separations from stable jobs for
reasons beyond their control) in North America is already extensive,
the European literature is limited.  We consider two labor markets in
which layoffs are heavily regulated (as opposed to the relatively flexi-
ble Canadian and United States labor markets).  We exploit administra-
tive data from both countries that match workers to their employers
and have the advantages (relative to survey-based analyses) of provid-
ing large, representative samples of a wide range of workers from all
sectors, thereby allowing for the straightforward construction of con-
trol groups.  Administrative data have the additional advantage that
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reported earnings and employment durations are precisely measured
and not subject to recall bias.
One particularity of our approach is that we focus our attention on
workers whose separation is a result of the closure of the employing
firm (in the case of France) or plant (in the case of Germany).  This is
for two main reasons.  First, our administrative data do not allow us to
distinguish the reason for separation when the separation is not related
to the employer's shutting down.  Second, our measure avoids the fre-
quently cited problem of relying on workers to accurately report the
reason for separation.  This is particularly important in heavily regu-
lated labor markets like those of France and Germany, since the admin-
istrative procedures that must be followed in the case of layoffs are
typically much longer and more complicated than the procedures sur-
rounding quits.  For this reason, declared quits in these countries may
frequently be layoffs disguised so as to avoid the administrative com-
plications.  Furthermore, workers often misreport firing for cause as a
layoff—and these two events can have very different implications for
the non-employment durations and earnings losses involved.
A second issue is that we consider non-employment, as opposed to
unemployment, durations following displacement.  We do so partly
because our data for France do not allow us to discern whether the
worker is actively looking for employment when not employed (as the
ILO definition of unemployment requires).  In Germany we observe
only unemployment benefit and unemployment assistance durations,
although individuals may experience spells of unemployment while
being ineligible for benefits.  We also limit ourselves to non-employ-
ment because the complexity of the unemployment insurance schemes
(see the section on institutions below) brings the explicit modeling of
their role beyond the scope of this chapter.1
In addition to describing the institutional context in France and
Germany, our analysis focuses on non-employment durations and earn-
ings changes experienced by workers who have stayed with a single
firm for at least four years as the principal measures of interest.  More
precisely, we look at prime-age males in the age range of 26–55 (for
France) and 25–56 (for Germany).  We distinguish between workers
who separate from their firm (in the case of France) or plant (in the
case of Germany) as a result of a closure (referred to as  displaced
workers) and those who separate for unknown reasons.  This last cate-
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gory includes workers who are fired for cause, workers who leave the
firm  or plant because they receive a better offer, and workers who drop
out of the labor force.2 The literature has concentrated primarily on
these measures,3 finding that displaced workers tend to experience
earnings losses both pre- and postdisplacement and that workers dis-
placed as a result of a firm or plant closure tend to have shorter non-
employment durations than workers who separate from from their
employers involuntarily for other reasons (Gibbons and Katz 1991).
The structure of our chapter is as follows.  We begin by describing
the institutional setting surrounding layoffs and unemployment bene-
fits in France and Germany.  This discussion provides the context in
which the subsequent results need to be considered.  Then, after
describing the data sources we use, we describe the incidence of dis-
placement in the two countries.  We then proceed with a more detailed
analysis of the non-employment durations following displacement, fol-
lowed by a description of the earnings changes associated with dis-
placement.   The next section provides results of a regression analysis
of earning changes before, around, and after displacement, and the
final section summarizes our results and concludes.
INSTITUTIONS
Both France and Germany have detailed regulations concerning
layoffs and unemployment compensation.  For each country, we
describe the institutions surrounding layoffs, followed by a brief
description of the unemployment benefit system and the main prevail-
ing-wage-setting mechanisms. 
France
Following is a brief summary of the labor law and jurisprudence
surrounding worker displacement, or layoffs for economic reasons.4
An excellent reference for this (in French) is Lefebvre (1996).
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Laws concerning layoffs for economic reasons (displacements)
The legislation and jurisprudence surrounding displacements dis-
tinguishes four classes of layoffs: individual, fewer than 10 employees
over 30 days, more than 10 employees over 30 days, and bankruptcy or
reorganization.5 One common characteristic of all displacements is that
the employer is required to offer the option of participating in a par-
tially employer-funded retraining scheme to all employees who will be
laid off.  This retraining program is run by the fund that finances unem-
ployment benefits (ASSEDIC) and made available. 
• Individual displacements have to meet the obligations surround-
ing both individual layoffs for personal reasons and layoffs of
fewer than 10 employees over 30 days (with the exception of the
obligation to inform the works council; see below).  The  obliga-
tions attached to the layoffs for personal reasons include an invi-
tation to a “reconciliation” meeting at which the layoff will be
discussed, an actual holding of the reconciliation meeting (to
which the worker can bring an outside representative), and a noti-
fication-of-layoff letter, all with required delays and notice peri-
ods.  The displaced employee must also be guaranteed priority in
future hiring for all jobs for which he or she is qualified, and this
obligation runs for one year following the layoff.
• The case of displacements involving fewer than 10 employees in
a 30-day period is more complicated than that of individual dis-
placements.  First, the works council (or personnel representa-
tives in firms too small to have a works council, that is, with
fewer than 50 employees) must be consulted.  The employer must
provide all useful information to the works council concerning
the economic circumstances that motivate the layoffs, the number
of employees to be laid off by occupational category, the criteria
used to determine the order of layoffs (in other words, which
employees will go), and a preliminary calendar for the layoffs.
Each employee must still be invited to a “reconciliation” meeting,
and the layoff letters can be sent out only after the appropriate
waiting period following this meeting.
• In the case of displacements involving more than 10 people in a
30-day period, things become even more complicated.  The enter-
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prise must devise a “social plan” which, in addition to proposing
ASSEDIC retraining programs, must describe the possibilities for
an internal reclassification within the enterprise (when the enter-
prise is larger than 50 employees) and the steps the enterprise is
prepared to take in terms of helping laid-off employees become
self-employed, providing training in new fields, or reducing the
workweek.  Along with all of the information described in the
previous case, this plan has to be given to the works council,
when one exists, or to the personnel delegates for consultation.
The works council can request the help of an “expert accountant”
to evaluate the different aspects of the employer’s social plan and
explanations for the layoffs.  The local labor ministry office also
receives a copy of the social plan, and both the works council and
the labor ministry can make suggestions to which the employer
must respond.  There must be two meetings held with the works
council, or three if the works council brings in an accountant.
There are specified delays between the meetings which vary with
the size of the proposed layoff, but there is no obligation to meet
individually with each employee in this case.  The selection of the
individuals to be laid off will typically be determined by a gov-
erning collective agreement, but in the absence of such an agree-
ment it is the employer who fixes the criteria after consultation
with the works council.  The layoff letters can be sent out only
after a fixed delay following the final meeting with the works
council.
• The conditions surrounding layoffs in the case of bankruptcy or
court-ordered reorganization are similar to those for the previous
case, except that it is the court-appointed administrator who
makes the proposals, and the judge responsible for overseeing the
liquidation or reorganization must approve all layoffs.
Advance notice and severance pay
The forewarning that workers receive before being laid off varies
according to the size of the layoff, whether or not an expert accountant
is called in, the size of the firm, and whether the employer and
employee agree upon a buyout of the notice period.  The time taken by
just following the legal procedure (prior to the official advance notice
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that starts running from the moment the layoff letter is received) can
vary from 1) 35 days between the mailing of the invitation to the “rec-
onciliation” meeting to 2) the sending out of the layoff letter (in the
case of an individual displacement), to 3) 74 days or more from the
date at which the first works council meeting is held (in the case of a
layoff of 10 or more people in 30 days, with expert accountant called
in, not counting the time it takes to devise the social plan or respond to
suggestions made by the works council and the labor ministry).  After
the layoff letters are sent out, the official advance-notice period begins.
This period is a function of seniority: a minimum of one month for
employees with six months to two years of seniority, and two months
for employees with at least two years of seniority.  If a collective agree-
ment exists that provides for longer notice periods, the longer periods
prevail.
Severance pay is a function of seniority, whether or not the em-
ployee had accrued unused paid vacation time, and whether the
employer buys off the official notice period.  In general, the base rate
of severance pay is 1/10th monthly earnings per year of seniority (if
seniority is greater than two years), with an additional 1/15th monthly
earnings per year of seniority if seniority is greater than 10 years.  The
worker also recovers the value of unused paid vacation time, plus one
to two months of earnings in the case where the notice time is bought
off, corresponding to the level of seniority. 
Unemployment benefit eligibility and levels
To be eligible for unemployment benefits, workers must meet the
following conditions.6 First, they must have been employed for a suffi-
ciently long period preceding the start of the episode of unemployment.
There are five criteria defining the minimum number of days or hours
worked over a reference period.7
Second, they must be enrolled on the National Job Search Agency
(ANPE) lists.  Third, they cannot have voluntarily quit their previous
job although layoffs, even for cause, are acceptable.8  Fourth, they must
be actively looking for a job or, if over 57-1/2 years old, must reside in
France.  Fifth, they must be younger than 60 or between 60 and 65 and
ineligible for retirement with full benefits.  Sixth, they must be physi-
cally able to hold down a job.  Finally, they cannot be “seasonally
unemployed”; that is, they can not have come from a job that is classi-
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fied as seasonal, nor can they have had a job that, for two of the prior
three years, had regular periods of inactivity at more or less the same
calendar dates each year.
Unemployment benefits are taxable as revenue and are made up of
a base rate that applies for a first period, then a “digressivity coeffi-
cient” which lowers the benefits for a second period.  The daily base
rate is comprised of a fixed component (56.95 francs in June 1996) and
a variable component corresponding to 40.4 percent of reference earn-
ings.  The total can neither exceed 75 percent of the reference level of
earnings nor be less than a statutory minimum level (138.84 francs in
June 1996).  There are also provisions relating to high-earnings work-
ers that guarantee them at least 57.4 percent of their reference earnings.
The digressivity coefficient and the durations of the benefit periods
are functions both of the age of the worker and his or her “length of
affiliation” (cumulative seniority in any covered employers during a
reference period).  Durations range from 1) 122 days (four months) for
workers with only 122 days or 676 hours of eligibility over the previ-
ous eight months (all at the second-period rate with a digressivity coef-
ficient of 0.75) to 2) an 821-day (27-month) first period and a 1,004-
day (33-month) second period, with digressivity coefficient of 0.92, for
workers over 55 years old with 821 days or 4,563 hours of eligibility
over the preceding 36 months.  Thus, if a 56-year-old person worked
27 out of the 36 months preceding a spell of unemployment, he or she
would have a right to five years of benefits, with the lowest rate still
being 92 percent of his or her previous benefit level.9
Wage-setting institutions
During the period of time covered by our French data (1984–
1989), the French industrial relations environment was undergoing
significant changes.  Although union membership was steadily declin-
ing, union coverage remained relatively stable.  This phenomenon was
due largely to the policy of contract extension.  This policy allows the
Ministry of Labor to take a collective agreement negotiated by an
employers’ association and several union confederations and extend
its coverage to all other enterprises in the same region or sector, or all
individuals in the same occupation, as those covered by the contract,
regardless of their participation or membership in the employers’ asso-
ciation or union confederation that actually negotiated the contract.10
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Despite the high level of contract coverage, important modifica-
tions of the structure of collective bargaining were brought about by
the Auroux laws of 1982.  Two of the most important features were 1)
the establishment of works councils and the definition of their consul-
tative role in mass layoffs (see above) and 2) the requirement to engage
in bargaining at the enterprise level for all firms over a minimum size.
Although there was no obligation to come to an agreement, the fact that
employers were required to negotiate locally encouraged a gradual
shift of collective bargaining over wages from a centralized to a more
decentralized level.  This shift reduced the frequency with which the
national, often extended, agreements had their salary grids renegoti-
ated.  Given the constant increase in the real minimum wage over the
period (see below), the share of contracts for which the lowest earners
on the salary grid earned more than the minimum wage fell from 15.3
percent in January of 1983 to 3.6 percent in January of 1985.11
The first minimum-wage law in France was enacted in 1950, creat-
ing a guaranteed hourly wage rate that was partially indexed to the rate
of increase in consumer prices.  Beginning in 1970, the original mini-
mum-wage law was replaced by the current system (called the SMIC,
for salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance), linking the
changes in the minimum wage to both consumer price inflation and
growth in the hourly blue-collar wage rate.  In addition to annual for-
mula-based increases in the SMIC, the government legislated increases
many times over the next two decades.  The statutory minimum wage
in France regulates the hourly regular cash compensation received by
an employee, including the employee’s part of any payroll taxes.
Although the original minimum wage program (called the SMIG,
for salaire minimum interprofessionnel garanti) was only partially
indexed—in particular, the inflation rate had to exceed 5 percent per
year (2 percent from 1957 to 1970) to trigger the indexation—the real
minimum wage did not decline measurably over the entire post-war
period and increased substantially during most decades.12  The French
minimum wage lies near most of the mass of the wage-rate distribution
for the employed workforce.  In 1990, the first mode of the wage distri-
bution was within 5 francs of the minimum wage and the second mode
was within 10 francs of the minimum.  In the overall distribution, 13.6
percent of the wage earners were at or below the minimum wage and
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an additional 14.4 percent were within an additional 5F per hour of the
SMIC.13
Germany
Employment security and dismissal protection
German dismissal protection is based on an extensive system of
legal rules and collective contracts.  Historically, dismissal protection
is rooted in a framework of directives developed during the Weimar
Republic.  It was developed in the 1950s to 1970s, and went through a
process of amendments during the 1970s and 1980s (see Büchtemann
1990).
One can distinguish between general dismissal protection and spe-
cific dismissal protection, with the latter applying to individuals in spe-
cific situations.  The general dismissal protection was first regulated in
the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) and in the Kündigungss-
chutzgesetz (KSchG).  Since those were enacted, however, it has
undergone a number of slight revisions.14 The most notable is the
Employment Promotion Act (Beschaftigungsforderungsgesetz), or
EPA of 1985, which is discussed below in more detail.
The KSchG applies to all blue- and white-collar workers with more
than six months of uninterrupted tenure in firms with more than six
regularly employed workers.  According to Büchtemann (1990), it cov-
ers about 80 percent of all blue- and white-collar workers.
The general dismissal protection regulations as laid out in the
KSchG are supplemented by regulations which apply to individuals in
specific circumstances.  For instance, specific regulations apply to
handicapped people, people on maternity leave, and people who are
serving in compulsory military or civil service.  In 1987–1988, 16 per-
cent of all dismissals fell under these complementary rules (see
Büchtemann 1990). 
According to the KSchG, all dismissals of employees who are
employed for more than six months without interruption, which are ini-
tiated by the employer, are invalid if they are socially unacceptable.
Accordingly, dismissals of all individuals to whom the KSchG applies
have to be justified by the employer.  Acceptable reasons for dismissal
may be due to the firm’s concerns or  macroeconomic shocks (or the
employee’s absenteeism or illness, for example).  In the case of dis-
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missals caused by economic difficulties on the side of the firm, the
KSchG stipulates that social criteria (such as seniority) should be used
to determine which employees are to be dismissed.  Employees who
feel that they have been unjustly dismissed have the right to sue the
employer in the labor courts.  In 1987, about 10 percent of dismissals
were brought to court by dismissed employees, although in very few
cases did this lead to a continuation of the employment relation (see
Büchtemann 1990).  In addition, German dismissal protection has a
strong collective component.  For every dismissal, the works council
has to be consulted.
Concerns about the negative effects of the rather rigid dismissal-
protection regulations on firms’ employment policies led to the
Employment Promotion Act of 1985.  The EPA introduced some
deregulating measures which do not replace, but rather complement,
existing employment-protection regulations.  They mainly promote
fixed-term contracts as an instrument for enhancing flexibility.  More
specifically, the EPA allows fixed term contracts to be established
without a particular reason (which was not the case before).  Contracts
are limited to a duration of 18 months, and they are not renewable.  The
EPA originally limited them to five years, but this was extended twice.
At present its applicability lasts until the year 2000 (see Rogowski and
Schömann 1996).
Advance notice and severance pay
The advance-notice period in Germany varies according to the size
of the layoff, the seniority of the worker, and whether he or she is a
blue- or white-collar worker.15  Furthermore, there are a number of col-
lectively bargained regulations as well as firm-worker specific agree-
ments that include notice provisions.  The legal advance-notice
regulations stipulate four weeks of notice for blue-collar workers who
have been employed for at least five years, and 12 weeks for white-col-
lar workers.  After 20 years of employment with the same firm, these
periods rise to 12 weeks and 24 weeks for blue- and white-collar work-
ers, respectively (see Buttler, Brandes, Dorndorf, Gaum, and Walwei
1992).
If a firm dismisses a considerable fraction of its workforce, the lay-
offs have to be reported to the local employment office and to the
works council.  For instance, a firm which employs between 21 and 59
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workers has to report if the number of dismissals exceeds six workers
within a period of 30 working days; a firm which employs between 60
and 499 employees has to report layoffs of more than 25 workers, or
when layoffs exceed 10 percent of the firm’s workforce; a firm which
employs more than 499 workers has to report if layoffs exceed 30
workers.
If the reduction in the firm’s workforce exceeds certain numbers,
the works council can demand a social plan.  For instance, when dis-
missals exceed 20 percent of the workforce (or at least six workers for
a firm of size 21–59 or more than 36 workers for a firm of size 60 to
249), a social plan can be demanded.  Social plans describe the condi-
tions surrounding severance pay and other payments. 
Unemployment benefit eligibility and levels
The German unemployment compensation scheme distinguishes
between unemployment insurance benefit (Arbeitslosengeld (AG)) and
unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe (AH)).  To be eligible for
AG, the employee must have contributed to the system for at least 12
months over the preceding three years.  The system is financed by
employer and employee contributions in equal parts (each part amount-
ing to 3.25 percent of the employee’s salary).  There is a waiting period
of 12 weeks if the separation was induced by the employee, but receipt
of AG starts immediately if the separation was caused by the employer.
The compensation is based on previous  net earnings, and it amounts to
67 percent of the previous net wage (60 percent for employees without
children).  There is an upper threshold (5,200 DM in 1984 and 6,000
DM in 1990, for instance).  AG can be received for up to 32 months,
with the duration of the entitlement period depending on age and the
length of contributions to the scheme.16
If AG is exhausted, or if the employee is not eligible for AG, he
can claim AH.  A condition for receiving AH in case of non-eligibility
for AG is having been in insured employment for at least 150 days dur-
ing the prior year.  Like AG, AH is based on previous earnings; it
amounts to 57 percent of previous net earnings (50 percent for employ-
ees without children).  AH is means tested, and its duration is unlim-
ited.
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Both AG and AH are granted conditional on the recipient's agree-
ment to accept reasonable employment (zumutbare Beschaftigung) and
are not subject to income tax.
Wage-setting institutions
In Germany, wages are determined by (annual) negotiations
between unions and employer federations (tariff parties, or  Tarif-
parteien).  Workers are represented in collective bargaining by unions
that are organized nationwide according to industries (see Schmidt
1994 for more details).  Union membership is not tied to a particular
job or firm; union workers usually remain with the union irrespective
of their mobility decisions, as well as through spells of non-employ-
ment.
Collective bargaining takes place on industry and regional levels.
During negotiations, parties have legally guaranteed autonomy.  The
results of the negotiations are laid down in tariff contracts (or Tarifver-
traege), which determine working conditions and wages.  These con-
tracts are registered at the Ministry of Labor.  Since the union is the
legal representative of all workers covered by collective bargaining
(irrespective of the workers’ union status), collective agreements apply
to all workers within the respective segment.
There are no legal minimum wages in Germany; however, tariff
contracts which specify wage levels for specific groups in specific sec-
tors can be considered as an elaborate system of minimum wages.
To enforce their bargaining position, unions have the right to call
strikes and employers have the right to lock out employees (Aussper-
rung), although this latter instrument is regulated by a number of legal
rules.  If the two parties have difficulties reaching a compromise, they
may call for a mediator.  The legal rules concerning the bargaining pro-
cedures, as well as the commitment that binds the two parties to the
agreed contract, are laid down in the tariff contract law (Tarifvertrags-
gesetz).
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DATA
We use administrative data from Social Security records for Ger-
many, and payroll taxes for France, in some cases supplemented with
data from other sources.  We briefly describe these data sources below. 
France
Base data set
The base data set for France is the Annual Social Data Reports
(Déclarations Annuelles des Données Sociales, or DADS), which is a
random 1/25 sample of the French population.17 All people born in
October of an even-numbered year, with the exception of civil servants
(but including those employed by publicly held companies), are in the
data set whenever they are employed.18 These data cover the period
1976–1996, with the exception of 1981, 1983, and 1990, since the
French National Statistics Institute (INSEE) did not collect the 1/25
sample in those years.  These data include earnings information from
all employers of all of these individuals, with both individual and
employer identifiers attached to each year-individual-enterprise-estab-
lishment observation.19  We also have the number of days worked dur-
ing the course of the year and the job start and end dates (if the job
began or ended during the year).  We impute information using auxil-
iary regressions run on other data sets to determine the job start dates
for the left-censored spells.20 Temporary layoffs (of a length shorter
than one calendar year) are not considered as interruptions of an
employment spell.  With this information, we can calculate seniority at
each job for each year.  We observe seniority, gender, age, occupation,
region, full- or part-time employment status (but not hours), and sector
on all jobs held by the individual, and we can measure the length of
non-employment spells between jobs.
There are two problems with using this data set to study displaced
workers.  First, we do not know education, marital status, or number of
children, for example.  The Permanent Dynamic Sample (Echantillon
Dynamique Permanent, or EDP), provides some additional informa-
tion though.  INSEE collected data on individuals born on the first four
days of October that could be located in the 1968, 1975, 1982, or 1990
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censuses, or for whom one of the following was available: the individ-
ual’s birth, marriage, or death certificate  or the birth, death, or mar-
riage of a parent or child of the individual concerned.  Most of the
demographic information of interest comes from matches with the cen-
suses.  Since the EDP sampling frame overlaps that of the DADS in
even-numbered years, it was possible to obtain a data set with all of the
relevant variables from the combination of the DADS and the EDP.21
The remaining problem is to know the reason behind a separa-
tion.22  We use a two-step approach to identifying displacements, or
more precisely, firm deaths.23 First, we use the Unified System of
Enterprise Statistics (Systeme Unifie de Statistiques d’Entreprise, or
SUSE), to determine the last year in which the employing firm filed
accounts with any of France’s administrative authorities.24 We then
look at all of the observations in the DADS that correspond to a given
enterprise (not establishment).  If the last year in which we observe
data corresponding to the enterprise is 1996, we consider all separa-
tions from that employer as being for reasons other than firm death.25
If, on the other hand, we observe a firm for which the last year with
DADS data is, say, 1985, we compare this date to the date found in the
SUSE (where available).  We consider the latter of the two dates for a
given enterprise as its estimated death date, and we consider enter-
prises that filed accounts or were paying employees in 1996 as ongo-
ing.
For the “dying” enterprises, we attempt to control for false firm
deaths (change of firm identifier without cessation of activity) with the
following procedure.  Given that we only observe a random sample of
1/25 of any firm’s employment, we apply the procedure only to firms
with at least three observed employees.26  For these firms, we test the
hypothesis that 50 percent or more of the firm’s actual employees leav-
ing the enterprise at its estimated death date were employed by the
same subsequent employer, conditional on the total number of
observed employees and the share of those who move together to the
same subsequent firm identifier.  This procedure is described in detail
in Appendix A.27
Based on this dating procedure and correction, we construct two
definitions of displacement.  In the first, the worker separates from the
firm within the calendar year preceding the calendar year of the firm’s
death.28 In the second, we widen the window to two years preceding the
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year of the firm’s death.  We report below results based on the
two-year window definition, since our procedure for dating firm deaths
is not very precise (particularly when SUSE data are involved) and
because advance-notice provisions may mean that some workers sepa-
rate from their firm prior to its actual shutdown (see Appendix B).29 All
other separations are classed as “other separations.”
It should be noted that, given the sampling scheme of the DADS,
this approach over-attributes separations to the “displaced” category.
This is even more likely to be the case for separations from small firms,
especially when the separation occurs near the end of the sample
period.  Our selection criterion reduces the risk of this source of over-
classification somewhat (see below).  Nevertheless, all of our results
for France should be interpreted with this in mind.30
The sample retained for analysis
From the overall data base, we focus in particular on men between
26 and 50 years of age with four or more years of seniority in 1984.31
These restrictions were imposed so that we could restrict our attention
to adult,32 high-attachment workers without a risk that they would take
early retirement in the later years in the sample.33 We exclude all indi-
viduals with more than three different employers in any given year, as
well as all individuals who held multiple jobs simultaneously at any
point during our analysis window.34 As a further control against early
retirement, our duration analyses exclude all workers who, following
separation from their employer, experienced a censored non-employ-
ment spell that pushed them above 56 years old (the minimum age for
men to receive early retirement).  Appendix C shows the differential
effect of imposing this latter restriction by age at separation.35
We focus on individuals observed during the window of 1984–
1989 for three reasons.  First, given our definition of firm death for
workers not matched to SUSE firms, we wanted to allow a time period
after the end of the analysis period during which we might observe
people in a “dead” firm, in order to minimize incorrect classifications.
Second, given the data missing from 1983 and 1990, this is the longest
period without interruption in our data.  Finally, this sample window
makes the French data comparable with the German data (see below).
In general, we concentrate on the first separation observed for the
individual in the sample window (1984–1989), and, in so doing, ignore
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the issue of multiple displacements (Stevens 1997).36 As mentioned
above, our data include information on the year, age, education, senior-
ity, log real annual gross earnings, sector of activity, skill level
(unskilled blue-collar, skilled blue-collar or white-collar), region and,
of course, the reason for separation (displacement or other, calculated
according to the procedures described above), if it occurred.  Appendix
D provides descriptive statistics for the full sample in 1984.
For the analyses of displacement incidence and earnings changes
surrounding separations, we aggregated our data to one observation per
individual per year.37 In years preceding the separation, if the individ-
ual was employed by the employer from whom he or she will eventu-
ally separate, we keep the descriptive information (sector, occupation,
seniority) corresponding to that job.  For all other individual-year com-
binations, the descriptive information corresponds to the job the person
held for the longest duration during the year, and in the case of ties, the
job that provided the highest gross earnings.
The earnings measure used for the French data is the log of Total
Average Real Daily Earnings,38 corresponding to the log of the average
of daily labor earnings from all sources, weighted by the number of
days worked in the particular job (measured in thousands of 1980
francs).39 The precise formula is
(1)
where RAE is the real gross annual earnings received by individual  i in
year t from firm j, dwi,j,t is the number of days worked by individual i
in firm j during year t, and J(i,t) is the set of firms  j in which individual
i worked during year t.
Germany
Base data set
The data used for Germany, which will be referred to as the IAB
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from the Beschaftigungsstichprobe (BS) of the Institut fur Arbeits-
markt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) in Nürnberg.  The BS is a 1 percent
sample from the overall employees’ statistics, the so-called historic file
Historikdatei (HD), of the Federal Department of Employment in
Nürnberg, which is constructed as an insurance account, and contains a
continuous employment history for each employee covered by the
social security system.  The BS is drawn in two stages (see Bender,
Hilzendegen, Rohwer, and Rudolph 1996 for details) and covers a
period of 16 years (1975–1990).  It comprises 426,363 individuals in
the longitudinal dimension and, on average, around 200,000 individu-
als in the yearly cross-sectional dimension.
On January 1, 1973, an integrated reporting procedure for health,
retirement, and unemployment insurance was introduced in Germany.
The data collected using this process form the basis for the HD.  The
procedure requires employers to report any commencement and termi-
nation of an employment relation which is subject to social security
contributions.  Additionally, to guarantee continuity in the registration
of employment histories, employers have to provide information on
every ongoing employment relation which is subject to social security
payments on December 31 of every year.  The information reported by
the employer each time includes individual characteristics, such as
gender, nationality, and educational attainment, as well as gross earn-
ings over the past employment spell which served as the basis for
social security contributions.40  Furthermore, the HD also contains
information on spells of interrupted employment relations, like mater-
nity leave or obligatory military and civil service. 
The HD does not include individuals who are below the earnings
threshold which makes social security contributions compulsory unless
they have been in an employment relation which was subject to social
security contributions at an earlier stage of their career.  It further
excludes the self-employed, state civil servants, and individuals who
are in compulsory military service or alternative compulsory activities.
For 1980, Herberger and Becker (1983) estimate that the HD com-
prises 79 percent of the total labor force.
In addition to information available in the BS, the IAB data contain
information from a second important data source, the Leistungsemp-
fangerdatei (LD) of the employment office.  The LD contains data cov-
ering spells for individuals who received certain benefit payments from
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the Federal Department of Employment.  These payments include
unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance, and payments
while participating in training and retraining programs.  This additional
data source allows us to follow individuals during periods of registered
non-employment, too.  It is important to note, however, that not all
spells of registered non-employment are included in the LD.  For
instance, active labor market programs (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnah-
men) are not covered.  Furthermore, individuals have to fulfill certain
requirements to be eligible for unemployment benefits or unemploy-
ment assistance (see above).  Those who do not fulfill these require-
ments are likewise not included in the LD.
The IAB data set combines information on individual employees
(from the BS and the LD) with plant information.  Every individual in
the HD is associated to a plant with a plant identifier.  In a separate step
and using the entire database, information about individuals is
regrouped at the plant level.  This allows us to add plant information to
individual records contained in the IAB data.  In particular, informa-
tion about plant size and the educational structure of the workforce, as
well as industry information, is added.  The plant-level statistics, how-
ever, concern only those individuals who are covered by the social
security system. 
The sample retained for analysis
From the overall database, we extract a sample of high-attachment
workers.  We select male workers who were between 25 and 50 years
old in 1984.  We use this age group to avoid including separations for
early retirement and to exclude individuals who might not yet have fin-
ished their schooling. 
Although our observation window covers the period between 1975
and 1990, we concentrate our analysis on the last decade.  The reason
is that the earnings information before 1984 is only of limited use.
Until 1983, whether wages reported to the authorities contained addi-
tional payments, like holiday or Christmas money, was up to discretion
of the employer.  It was compulsory to include these payments after
1983.  Additional payments constitute a substantial part of the wage
bill of German employees—around 7 percent (see Dustmann and Van-
Soest 1997).  Furthermore, these payments are likely to be correlated
with variables like seniority, industry, and firm size.  For these reasons
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we decided to use earnings information only for the period between
1984 and 1990.
We select all workers who had been continuously employed with
the same establishment for at least four consecutive years in 1984.
Between 1984 and 1990 (the last year of our observation window)
these workers either stayed with their establishment or they separated.
Temporary spells of unemployment or non-employment with subse-
quent continued employment at the previous plant are not considered
as separations.
We distinguish two types of separations: separations due to plant
closure and separations for other reasons.  We define a worker as a dis-
placed worker if his separation is related to the establishment closing
down or to a significant reduction in the number of employees.  We
adopt three alternative definitions: a worker is displaced if his plant
closes down within one year of his departure (definition 1), within two
years of his departure (definition 2), or if he separates from a plant at
which employment falls by at least 40 percent within two years of his
departure (definition 3).  A plant closure occurs if the number of
employees within a plant drops to zero.41
The strictest definition is the first one.  By using this definition, we
may exclude workers who left earlier because they foresaw a closure,
or who were dismissed while the firm cut down on size prior to closure.
The last definition avoids this problem, but it may include workers who
separate for other reasons.  In most of the analysis, we adopt the second
definition.  We use the first and last definition to check the robustness
of our results.  Appendix Table 5.B1 describes how these measures dif-
fer. 
Another problem with the type of data we use is censoring.  If indi-
viduals lose their jobs, they may or may not return to the sample within
the observation window.  Those who do not return may change into
states not recorded by our data, like nonparticipation, retirement,
self-employment, or civil service; they may also leave the country.
This type of censoring is a particular problem with administrative data.
The question is how to treat censored observations.  Analyses of
non-employment duration, or reemployment probabilities, are sensitive
to the definition of the underlying sample and have to be understood in
that light.  We decided not to impose any restrictions; results should
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therefore be understood as referring to the whole population of workers
conditional on separation or displacement.
For illustrative purposes we use information about whether indi-
viduals claim unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance
after separations as a device to sort out individuals with a high likeli-
hood of leaving the sample.  After at least four years of continuous
employment (which is one of our criteria to enter the sample), every
individual is, in principle, eligible for both types of benefits.  Workers
who intend to return to the labor market are most likely to claim bene-
fits.  We single out workers who do not return to the sample after sepa-
ration and who do not claim benefits.  Appendix E splits up the total
sample of workers who separate from a firm into those who return into
employment within the observation window (74 percent) and those
who do not (26 percent).  Of those who do not return, 30.6 percent
claim benefits. 
Appendix F displays sample statistics of worker characteristics for
the year 1984: we distinguish among workers continuously employed
between 1980 and 1990; workers whose first separation between 1984
and 1990 was a displacement (where displacement refers to separation
from a plant within two years of the plant closing down); and workers
whose first separation between 1984 and 1990 was for unknown rea-
sons.
The numbers in the table indicate that average gross daily earnings
of workers who are in continuous employment over the entire period
are higher than those of workers who separate for unknown reasons or
who are displaced.  Continuously employed workers also have higher
seniority in 1984, with more than 44 percent being with their firm for
more than 10 years (as compared to 27 percent for displaced workers,
and 24 for workers who separate for unknown reasons).  Interesting are
the numbers on plant size, which we measure in 1982, two years before
any closure can take place in our sample.  The average plant size for
continuously employed workers is 3,086, as compared to 1,653 for
other separations, and 160 for displacements.  Accordingly, workers
who are displaced according to our definition separate predominantly
from small firms.  The distributions are not symmetric, as indicated by
a comparison between the median and the mean. 
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The Incidence of Displacement in France and Germany
We address the question of the incidence of permanent job loss, or
displacement, in our data by two approaches.  First, we look at the
share of observations that correspond to displacements and separations
for other reasons in our data, and then we estimate probit models of the
incidence of displacements and other separations.  We follow different
approaches for the two countries.
For France, we consider the share of individuals in a given year
who experience each sort of separation.  Whereas Table 5.1 breaks
annual incidence for our sample down by year, we restrain our atten-
tion to the 1984 sample year for the decomposition of the incidence of
separation and the estimation of its determinants in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
This is because all individuals in the 1984 sample year have at least
four years of seniority on their first job that year, whereas individuals
observed in later years may be on postseparation jobs with low senior-
ity, and thus the distribution of job types in later years will not neces-
sarily be comparable with that of the year on which the sample
selection criterion was applied.
For Germany, we split our sample into three groups: Those who
are continuously employed with the same firm over the entire period
between 1980 and 1990 (32,594 individuals), those whose first separa-
tion (after 1984) is a displacement (3,273 individuals), and those
whose first separation (after 1984) is a separation for unknown reasons
(12,933 individuals).  In Table 5.4, we display characteristics of these
three samples, where the decomposition is by variables measured in
1984.  In Table 5.5, we estimate simple probability models, which
relate the probabilities of being in any of the three groups to individual
characteristics, again measured in 1984.
France
Table 5.1 describes the incidence of permanent separation, defined
as the share of individuals in a given year experiencing a given type of
permanent separation, in our data for all unique individual-year combi-
nations.42  Note that, as we are aggregating jobs to the individual-year
level, a person can experience both displacement and other separation
in the same year.  Thus, the sum of the number of individual-years with
displacements and other separations may exceed the number of indi-
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vidual-years with any separation.  This table covers all separations that
occur in our sample window, not just first separations, since (as noted
above) considering only first separations would bias our sample
increasingly toward stable individuals in the later years, thereby seri-
ously underestimating the incidence of separation toward the end of
our sample window.  The spike in 1989 is due to the fact that we are
missing data from 1990 (see below), and our coding algorithm would
attribute all changes in employer identifier between 1989 and 1991 to
the 1989 observation year, whereas at least some changes in employer
certainly occurred during the (missing) 1990 observation year.43  We
include women as a reference, although in what follows we restrict our
attention to men.
We find that the incidence of separation increased in France to a
peak at 1987 for both men and women, and then declined in the
remainder of the sample window.  Whereas the share of individuals
experiencing displacements seems to have peaked in 1988 for men, the
figures for women suggest a peak around 1986.  The increase for men
toward the end of the sample is likely related to the onset of the reces-
sion that began in the early 1990s, while the peak for women in 1986
corresponds to the slump that began in mid 1986 and ran through
spring 1987.44  Furthermore, there seem to be no major, consistent dif-
ferences between men and women over the entire sample period in
terms of either the share of separations in the total or the share of dis-
placements.  Since maternity leave, albeit generous by North American
standards, typically does not last longer than a full calendar year, and
since women are guaranteed a job with their previous employer upon
returning from maternity leave, such a lack of differences in separation
and displacement rates is less surprising.45
A similar breakdown of our data, aggregated to the individual-year
level, by seniority on the lost job and by age, all measured in the 1984
data year is presented in Table 5.2.  Although 96 individuals experi-
enced both a displacement and another separation, we count only the
first separation in the top half of the table, since the elimination of mul-
tiple-job holders implies that the second separations are from low-
seniority jobs that follow the first separation.
Table 5.2 shows that, although there is a clear decline in the share
of separations in total observations and the share of displacements in
total observations with previous job seniority in France (with the
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exception of the relatively underpopulated 8–10 years of seniority cate-
gory), the share of separations represented by displacements (defined
as separations in the two calendar years preceding the calendar year of
firm closure) is relatively invariant to seniority, and may even be
slightly increasing.46
Although the share of displacements and separations in the total
seems reasonable by North American standards, the share of separa-
tions attributed to the displaced category is quite high.  This is likely
due to two main reasons.  First, given the sampling frames in our data,
most departures from small firms will be classed as displacements,
since the chances of observing another sampled individual in the firm
or observing firm financial data after the separation are very low.  Sec-
ond, we are classifying separations occurring in a relatively long win-
dow preceding the calendar year of firm death as displacements.  This
approach will mislabel all separations that occur within the window but
are independent of the firm’s impending demise as displacements.
Unfortunately, given our data constraints, there is little we can do
about these problems.
A final point worth noting regarding Table 5.2 is that the share of
individuals experiencing a displacement, or any sort of separation, is
highest for the youngest and oldest age categories.  Given that younger
workers are less stable than older workers, the results for young people
are not surprising.  Despite our restraining our attention to workers
who are at most 50 years old in 1984, the possibility that some of these
workers’ employers may offer exceptional early retirement plans could
explain the results for older workers.47  For this reason (as mentioned
above), we impose an additional control for early retirement in our
analyses for postseparation non-employment durations.
In order to get a more precise view of the determinants of displace-
ment, we estimate probit models of the incidence of 1) displacement,
2) other types of separation, and 3) all separations combined on our
data from 1984.  The reference category is all alternative states (other
separations and no separations for model 1, displacements and no sepa-
rations for model 2, and no separations for model 3).  Constraining our-
selves to 1984 data provides us with estimates of the determinants of
annual probabilities of each sort of separation, and has the advantage of
substantially reducing the risk of separations into early retirement, as
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the oldest workers at this date are 50 years old.  Table 5.3 presents the
results of these models.48
The table suggests that the highest educational categories are the
most likely to separate for reasons other than firm closure, while the
only diploma that affects displacement is an advanced vocational edu-
cation (which reduces the risk of displacement relative to those without
any educational certification).  The probability of both displacement
and other sorts of separations is not significantly related to age in 1984,
a result which has also been found for the United States (Seitchik
1991).  However, the most senior workers are clearly less likely to
experience a separation, ceteris paribus, among the workers in our
sample.  Although the differences among 4–6, 6–8, and 8–10 years of
seniority are not significant, all have a significantly higher probability
of experiencing a displacement than workers with 10 or more years of
seniority.  These results are consistent with Table 5.2 and further rein-
force the idea that the incidence of worker displacement declines with
the seniority of the worker.  Similar results are found for workers with
4–8 years of seniority (relative to 10 and above) when considering sep-
arations for other reasons.  Many theoretical models predict a decline
in mobility with job seniority, so this result is not surprising. 
Germany
In Table 5.4 we report numbers on continuously employed workers
over the period 1980–1990 (our reference group), and the number of
displaced workers and workers who separate for unknown reasons dur-
ing our sample window.49 Recall that our selection criterion is that all
workers joined the plant in 1980 or earlier.  Seniority and age refer to
1984.
On average, 6.71 percent of all workers who have been in continu-
ous employment with one firm between 1980 and 1984 experience a
separation between 1984 and 1990 because the plant closes down.
This percentage is slightly higher at the lower seniority levels, and
lower at the higher seniority levels, indicating that plants which close
down tend to have workers with lower levels of seniority.  One reason
may be that these plants are younger.  There is no clear age pattern; dis-
placed workers account for 20.19 percent of the by-age sample of sepa-
rated workers.
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Among the continuously employed workers, 44 percent have been
with the same plant for at least 10 years in 1984; for displaced workers
and workers who separate for unknown reasons, this number is lower:
26 percent and 24 percent respectively.  Accordingly, although we
used the same selection criterion to construct our samples (to have
been with the same firm for at least four years in 1984), the distribution
of seniority differs according to their future separation status.  The age
distribution is more similar among the three groups, with more than 70
percent of workers concentrated in the age range between 30 and 50.
To investigate the effect of observables on the separation and dis-
placement probability in finer detail, we estimate simple probit models
(Table 5.5), where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual
is displaced or separated for unknown reasons (“other separations”)
over the period 1984–1990.50 The values of regressors refer to 1983,
the last year before a separation could take place.  The benchmark
group are workers who are continuously employed with the same firm
between 1980 and 1990. 
We first discuss displacement.  The estimates compare characteris-
tics of workers in plants which close down between 1984 and 1990
with characteristics of workers in plants which do not; this is condi-
tional on the two groups being employed for at least four years in 1984,
and the latter group being employed between 1980 and 1990 with the
same plant. 
Age has a nonsignificant effect on the displacement probability
(Table 5.5).  This may be interpreted as an indication that the age struc-
ture of workers in firms which close down is not different from that of
the reference group.  The displacement probability decreases slightly
with seniority—workers affected by a closure over the 1984–1990
window are characterized by less tenure than workers who are not.
The benchmark for the education categories are workers without
apprenticeship and without a high school degree.  The negative signs of
higher education dummies indicate that the skill mix of workers
affected by displacement is weighted toward lower education groups,
compared to our reference group.
The results for “other separations” are quite different.  Remember
that workers separated for unknown reasons include workers who are
fired for cause, as well as workers who quit.  Here, age has a strong
negative effect.  This is to be expected, given that age should affect the
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separation probabilities for both groups of workers in this category
negatively.  First, firing of workers becomes more expensive the older
they are because of institutional regulations; and second, age is posi-
tively related to the match quality, and the mobility of workers
decreases with age.  Unlike displaced workers, higher education now
has a positive effect on the separation probability.  This may indicate a
higher degree of mobility for the well educated. 
Durations out of Work
In North America, displaced workers often experience periods out
of work following their displacement prior to finding another job.  In
the more heavily regulated labor markets of France and Germany,
advance-notice requirements are meant to reduce or eliminate periods
out of work.  The analysis of non-employment durations following dis-
placement in France and Germany may provide additional insight into
the functioning of the labor markets in these countries, and into the role
that differences in the institutional environment might play in deter-
mining the speed of reemployment.  In both countries, we focus on the
first separation that occurs within our sample windows.
France
Table 5.6 breaks down all first separations in our data by seniority
and describes the share of separations which are followed by a period
out of work.  This is further broken down into displacements and other
sorts of separations.
The numbers in Table 5.6 demonstrate that the percentage of those
who experience a non-employment spell after separating from the firm
declines with seniority in France.  Furthermore, the share of posi-
tive-duration non-employment spells is lower in general for displaced
workers than for workers who separate for unknown reasons, with the
difference being the most flagrant for the least senior workers. 
Overall, Table 5.6 shows that approximately 22 percent of workers
who lose stable jobs because of firm closure never experience an inter-
ruption in their employment histories as a result of their displacement.
This may be due to the employment-protection legislation described
above.  In fact, given the rigidity of the employment-protection legisla-
tion and the long advance-notice periods it implies, one might wonder
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why the share of direct transitions is not higher.  This is probably due
to the length of the window we use for defining displacement, which
includes separations that are not necessarily related to the firm closure
and thus do not necessarily benefit from such generous employment-
protection legislation.
To offer a sense of the duration of non-employment spells when
they do occur, we show the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the nonparamet-
ric survival functions of postseparation non-employment spells for all
spells of positive duration (in Figure 5.1).  Note that these results are
conditional on experiencing a non-employment spell of positive length,
and that (as is always the case in duration modeling) our estimates are
sensitive to the treatment of censored observations.51
Displaced workers clearly leave non-employment at a faster rate
than workers who separate for other reasons.  These differences are
highlighted by the differences in long-term non-employment between
displaced workers and those who separate for other reasons.  In France,
less than 18 percent of displaced workers who experience a non-
employment spell are still without employment five years after dis-
placement, while roughly 30 percent of workers who separate for other
Figure 5.1 Kaplan-Meier Survivor Functions, France
402 Bender, Dustmann, Margolis, and Meghir
reasons  and enter non-employment are without a job five years after
separation.52
Of course, the differences between displaced workers and other
separators in France may only be superficial: the Kaplan-Meier survi-
vor functions we have drawn in Figure 5.1 do not consider the differ-
ences in the characteristics of the two populations.  It may simply be
the case that other separators have characteristics that make finding a
new job harder and, thus, these workers would take longer to find new
jobs irrespective of the reason for the separation.  To control for
observable heterogeneity in the populations, we estimate durations of
non-employment by using proportional hazard models with
Weibull-distributed baseline hazards for France.53  The effects of dif-
ferent covariates on non-employment durations following separations
are given in Table 5.7 for workers with at least four years of seniority
on the job of their first separation.54
We estimate models with 1) both types of workers and an indicator
variable for firm closure, as well as separately for 2) displaced workers
and 3) workers who separate for other reasons.  The first specification
is equivalent to imposing an identical baseline hazard and identical
coefficients on all covariates except the constant across the second and
third specifications. 
Table 5.7 shows that the shape parameter of the Weibull model is
always less than 1, indicating that the conditional probability of leaving
unemployment decreases over time (decreasing hazard).  This is con-
sistent with the nonparametric hazard underlying Figure 5.1.  The
results in the first column show that individuals who separate because
of a closure have a higher conditional probability of reentering
employment than individuals who separate for other reasons.  This can
be explained by the set of individuals in the samples we are analyzing;
since we only consider individuals who experience a non-employment
spell of positive duration, the group of workers who separate for other
reasons may consist mainly of workers who were fired for cause.
Seniority in the preseparation firm seems to slow exit from non-
employment in France for both sorts of separations, and this effect
seems slightly stronger for displaced workers (relative to those who
separate for other reasons).  In general, most types of education seem
to help workers leave non-employment faster, relative to workers with-
out any degree, although which degrees help the most varies by reason
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for separation.  For displaced workers, those with an advanced voca-
tional school or a graduate school or grande école degree find new jobs
the fastest, while among workers who separate for reasons other than
firm closure, the degrees that count are a high school baccalauréat, an
undergraduate, or a grande école or graduate school degree (the voca-
tional degrees are marginally less important).  The results for displaced
workers suggest the importance of being able to signal a particular
competency after one’s firm closes via an advanced vocational certifi-
cation or a relatively specialized graduate degree.  One explanation
could be that since firm closure is such a dramatic event, when a firm
closes it may be a sign of ill health in the industry in general.  As such,
workers who are able to point to advanced skills may find it easier to
get new jobs than those whose abilities are more closely linked to their
previous employer’s industry.  The results for other separators may
reflect the value that a more general education might have in counter-
balancing the negative signal sent by a firing for cause, as well as the
extensive networks that some grandes écoles have available to help
place their alumni who might otherwise have difficulty.
Germany
The number and the percentage of workers who experience a
non-employment spell in Germany are reported in Table 5.8.  On aver-
age, about 50 percent of workers who separate from their firms imme-
diately find another job.  The number is slightly lower for displaced
workers (39.5 percent), and slightly higher for workers who separate
for unknown reasons (51.6 percent).  The likelihood of a non-employ-
ment spell decreases slightly with job tenure, particularly for displaced
workers.
Figures on non-employment include all individuals who do not
experience a job-to-job transition, including individuals who leave the
labor force into other states (see discussion above).  The numbers are
therefore not directly interpretable as the percentage of individuals
who experience non-employment after a separation and would like to
remain in the labor market.  Figures for this type of worker will gener-
ally be lower.
Next, we investigate the duration of spells of non-employment for
those individuals who experienced a non-employment spell after sepa-
ration.  Figure 5.2 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival
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functions of postseparation non-employment spells for all spells of
positive duration.  Observations are treated as censored if they have not
reentered the workforce at the end of the observation window (Decem-
ber 1990).  The graphs indicate that displaced workers leave non-
employment at a faster rate than workers who separate for other rea-
sons.
In order to learn about the relation between individual characteris-
tics and the conditional probability of reentering employment after a
separation, conditional on having had a non-employment spell, we esti-
mate durations of non-employment using Cox models, which avoid
parametric assumptions about the baseline hazard.  The effect of differ-
ent covariates on non-employment durations following separation are
given in Table 5.9.  We estimate the models separately for displaced
workers and workers who separate for other reasons. 
In the first model, we do not distinguish between the two types of
separation.  We include an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if sep-
aration is due to closure.  As already indicated by the Kaplan-Meier
estimates, workers who are displaced and experience a subsequent
non-employment spell are more rapidly reabsorbed by the labor market
Figure 5.2 Kaplan-Meier Survivor Functions, Germany
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than workers who separate for other reasons.  This latter group is likely
to include primarily workers who were dismissed for cause, since
workers who quit because they received better outside offers are
unlikely to experience non-employment spells after separation. 
The seniority variables refer to seniority prior to separation.
Seniority plays no role in changing the rate of exit from non-employ-
ment for workers who are displaced for unknown reasons, but it
increases the conditional probability of a return to work for displaced
workers.  Recall that seniority also reduces the probability of experi-
encing a non-employment spell for these workers.  Age has a negative
effect for both groups, indicating that older workers find it more diffi-
cult to get a job offer than younger ones, regardless of the reason for
separation.  The educational indicators are marginally significant.
They indicate a negative relationship between education and the condi-
tional probability of exit from non-employment for displaced work-
ers.  This may reflect the higher level of benefits for educated
workers.55
Earnings before and after Separation 
The literature notes that wage losses occur, in particular, for work-
ers who lose jobs in which they had a high level of seniority.  It has
also been noted that these wage losses begin prior to displacement, and
that measuring wage losses by comparing only the final wage on the
job from which the worker was displaced with the new wage is likely
to underestimate the size of these losses.  In this section, we describe
the time paths of daily earnings and changes in earnings growth in the
years surrounding separations.
France
Figure 5.3 plots average daily earnings for French workers who
were continuously employed over the at-risk period (1984–1989),
workers whose first separation was a displacement during that period,
and workers whose first separation was for another reason during that
period.  We include only individuals with strictly positive average
daily earnings for our calculations.56 For expository purposes, we look
in particular at individuals whose first separation took place in 1987, if
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at all.  We consider separations from all years combined starting with
the next table.
In France, average daily earnings increased faster between 1986
and 1988 for workers displaced in 1987 than for workers who were
continuously employed over the entire 1984–1989 period with the
same employer and for those whose first separation was in 1987 and
for reasons other than firm closure.  Figure 5.3 illustrates that average
real daily earnings grew by 2.01 percent for continuously employed
workers between 1986 and 1988 and by 7.80 percent for other separa-
tors over the same interval, while average daily earnings jumped by
16.43 percent for displaced workers across the 1986–1988 interval.57
Part of this might be due to what is called “partial unemployment” in
the period leading up to firm closure.  In France, a firm can negotiate a
contract with the unemployment insurance fund to put its workers on
partial unemployment, in which case the worker receives a fixed frac-
tion of his or her prior salary with the costs split between the employer
Figure 5.3 Average Daily Earnings Over Time by Type of Separation, 
France
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and the unemployment insurance fund.  The worker does not report to
work, but maintains the employment relationship.  If employers report
only their (lower) share of the (lower) workers’ earnings paid during
this period while not reducing the reported number of days for which
compensation was paid, this would artificially lower the predisplace-
ment earnings level.  However, Figure 5.3 does not show such a pre-
separation drop in relative earnings, and even if such a phenomenon
were present, it seems unlikely that average daily earnings in France
would decline around separation.58
Another interesting point to draw from Figure 5.3 is the order of
earnings levels among the three categories.  It appears that in the time
before separation, displaced workers have earnings that are, on aver-
age, lower than other sorts of workers, be they continuously employed
or separated for reasons other than displacement.  Workers who sepa-
rate from their employers in France for the first time (in the 1984–1989
window) by displacement in 1987 earn 11.8 percent less in 1984 than
those whose first separation is for other reasons, who in turn earn 1.3
percent less than workers who are continuously employed over the
whole period.  During the period preceding separation, there seems to
be very little difference between continuously employed workers and
those who separate for reasons other than displacement, while through-
out this period displaced workers earn less.  Still, in the period immedi-
ately after the separation, average daily earnings for displaced workers
who have found new jobs have almost completely caught up with con-
tinously employed workers, being only 1.2 percent below, while work-
ers who separate for other reasons and are employed in the year after
separation pull ahead of continuously employed workers, earning 3.2
percent more.
A final point worth noting is the dip in average real daily earnings
between the year following separation and two years after separation,
for both displaced workers and those who separate for other reasons.
Since we are calculating the averages used to draw Figure 5.3 from
employed individuals only, this dip (or rather, lack of recovery) could
be due to a composition effect.  It may be that workers who take longer
to find a job after separation earn less on their new job than those who
find their new job sooner (and already have a year of seniority).  We
explore this idea further below.
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Table 5.10 considers the raw averages in more detail, looking at
long differences (of at least two periods) in average daily earnings
around the displacement or separation date by seniority (prior to sepa-
ration), distinguishing among continuously employed workers, dis-
placed workers, and workers who separate for other reasons.  For the
continuously employed, the table simply provides two-year differences
in average real earnings.  For displaced and other separated workers,
the numbers refer to the earnings difference between the new job in the
year after the separation year (if a new job has been found) and the old
job in the year prior to the separation year.  Otherwise the numbers
refer to the difference between the earnings in the first year in which a
new job has been found and the old job.  We have also differentiated
workers who are observed in employment, at the earliest, two calendar
years after separation; we refer to these workers as “slow displaced”
and “slow other separations.”
Table 5.10 confirms the intuition derived from Figure 5.3.  Consid-
ering all displacement dates simultaneously, we find that displaced
workers as a whole make faster earnings gains than continuously
employed workers or workers who separate for other reasons.  Earn-
ings losses occur on average for both displaced and other separating
workers who take more than a year to find a new job.  Despite the fact
that slow job finders make up a relatively small share of workers who
eventually find jobs following separation within our sample window, it
will become clear in our earnings regressions below that it is important
to distinguish them from workers who find new jobs within the first
calendar year after separation. 
Germany
Average daily earnings for German workers who were continu-
ously employed over the at-risk period (1984–1990), workers whose
first separation was a displacement and took place in 1988, and work-
ers whose first separation was for another reason and took place in
1988 are plotted in Figure 5.4.  The separation year 1988 is omitted.
Only employed individuals contribute to the averages on which the fig-
ures are based.  We do not include workers who are not employed in a
given year after separation.
The figure indicates that displaced and other separated workers
experience earnings growth at a rate similar to continuously employed
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workers between the pre- and postseparation year.  Another interesting
point is that it appears that displaced workers have daily earnings that
are, on average, lower than other sorts of workers, be they continuously
employed or separated for reasons other than displacement.
Table 5.11 considers the raw averages in more detail, looking at
long differences (of at least two years) in average earnings around the
displacement or separation date.  We distinguish among different lev-
els of seniority (prior to separation), and among continuously
employed workers, displaced workers, and workers who separate for
other reasons.  For the continuously employed, the table simply pro-
vides two-year differences in average earnings.  For displaced and sep-
arated workers, the numbers refer to the earnings difference between
the new job in the year after the separation occurs and the old job in the
year prior to the separation.  Obviously, this includes only workers
who have found a job in the year after separation.  The columns “Dis-
placed I” and “Separated I” report earnings growth of workers who are
observed in employment, at the earliest, two calendar years after sepa-
Figure 5.4 Average Daily Earnings Over Time by Type of Separation, 
Germany
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ration.  Although the earnings data are top coded—overall, 12.7 per-
cent of the sample is affected in 1983 (see data section for details)—we
do not account for this in Table 5.11.  This point is considered explic-
itly below.
Table 5.11 indicates that average two-year earnings growth for
continuously employed workers is 4.6 percent.  Pre- to postdisplace-
ment earnings growth for displaced workers and workers separated for
unknown reasons are 2.8 percent and 3.2 percent, respectively.  The
numbers confirm the intuition derived from Figure 5.4 that workers
who separate continue to make earnings gains.  Gains have a slight ten-
dency to decrease with seniority, but a clear pattern is visible only for
workers separated for unknown reasons.
The picture looks entirely different, however, for workers who are
only able to find a job, at the earliest, two years after displacement
(“Displaced I” and  “Separated I”).  Here earnings decrease substan-
tially: they drop by 7.3 percent for displaced workers and by 14.2 per-
cent for workers who separate for other reasons.  The large earnings
loss of the latter group may reflect the likelihood that this group con-
sists mainly of workers who have been laid off for cause.
A problem in our data is that we observe closures only at the plant
level.  Therefore, some plants may disappear due to reorganization, and
workers may continue to work in the same firm, but in a plant with a
different identifier.  Although this event is not likely to be frequent, it
may distort our results.  On the basis of the data we have available, it is
not possible to sort out these “false” plant closures.
Workers whose plants disappear because of a reorganization
should appear as direct transitions.  We have therefore computed earn-
ings losses for displaced workers who have experienced a non-employ-
ment spell after separation lasting at least one week.  This will most
likely eliminate workers who change plant numbers for reorganiza-
tional reasons.  However, it also restricts the sample to lower quality
workers—workers who are not able to find a new job immediately.
Accordingly, the corresponding numbers may be seen as lower bounds
for earnings losses incurred by displacement.  We report these results
in the column, “Displaced II.” A total of 644 displaced workers experi-
ence a non-employment spell of at least six days after displacement
and are reemployed in the year after displacement.  Their average earn-
ings loss is –1.46 percent.  Earnings losses are clearly higher for work-
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ers with higher levels of seniority before displacement.  This may be an
age effect, or it may indicate the loss of firm-specific human capital
incurred by these workers.
We conclude from these numbers that average losses incurred by
displacement are, in the worst case, around 1.5 percent.  At the same
time, those workers who are continuously employed experience an
earnings increase of about 4.6 percent.  Assuming that this number
reflects the earnings growth that workers who are displaced would
have experienced had their plants not closed down, the worst case sce-
nario is that the decline in earnings growth associated with a plant-clo-
sure-related displacement is about 6 percent.  More serious earnings
losses are experienced by workers who are not able to rejoin the labor
market in the year after displacement, however. 
Regression Analysis of Pre- and Postseparation Earnings
In this section, we compare the pre- and postseparation earnings
paths of displaced and continuously employed workers more generally.
As a descriptive tool, we estimate simple earnings regressions on vari-
ous subpopulations.  The general estimation strategy is as follows.59
We regress the logarithm earnings on time-invariant and time-
varying individual specific characteristics (xi and zit), time effects δ,
and a vector of indicator variables kis, which switch from 0 to 1 s years
after separation, or –s years before separation.  Depending on the
specification, the coefficients on the kis variables measure the differ-
ence in the level of earnings of workers s years before or after separa-
tion and the earnings of either continuously employed workers, or the
difference in earnings with respect to other workers who separate for
the same reason measured in a reference year,60 conditional on time
effects and observable individual characteristics.  We also add the
variables ksιτ, which take on the value 1 in the after-separation period
for those individuals who are not observed in employment in the year
after separation.  The parameter on these variables, ξ, picks up a nega-
tive permanent effect for those individuals who remain out of work for
more than one year after separation.  Finally, uit is a disturbance term.
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where (w) is the set of postseparation dates and (A) is the set of pre-
and postseparation dates (with or without an indicator for the year
immediately preceding separation, depending on the specification). 
France
The results of estimating this model on average daily earnings in
France are shown in Table 5.12.61   To ease interpretation of the results,
we replace the indicator variable for five years before separation with
an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 for all individuals who
separate (the variable Separated).  This allows us to sweep out the aver-
age difference between separators and the continuously employed, and
we can interpret the coefficients on the other relative year indicators
(Sepi ) in terms of an earnings path for workers who separate.
The first column compares workers who are displaced because of
plant closure between 1984 and 1989 with workers who are continu-
ously employed over that period.  The second column compares con-
tinuously employed workers with workers who separate for unknown
reasons.  As mentioned above, these latter separations consist of volun-
tary quits and firings for cause.  The variable Perm takes on the value 1
in all years following the first separation if it took the individual more
than 12 months to find a job after displacement.  As mentioned above,
the variable Separate takes on the value 1 for all workers who separate,
and the Sepi variables assume the value 1 in the ith year prior to or fol-
lowing the worker’s first separation.  Thus the coefficient on Separate
can be interpreted as the difference in earnings five years prior to sepa-
ration for workers who will eventually separate from their employers
relative to the continuously employed, and the coefficients on the Sepi
variables are interpreted as variations in earnings for workers who will
eventually separate relative to their earnings five years before separa-
tion.  Note that we are considering only the first separation as the refer-
ence in these regressions, and that we have excluded earnings in the
separation year for workers who separate.  The reason is that the earn-
ings in the separation year may come from both pre- and postsepara-
tion employers, and the interpretation of this coefficient would be
unclear.
Table 5.12 shows that, even after controlling for observable indi-
vidual characteristics, workers who separate because of firm closure
earn 8.8 percent less than continuously employed workers five years
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prior to the actual separation.62 This could be due in part to unobserved
heterogeneity across individuals, in other words, to individuals em-
ployed by firms that will close who would be earning less anyway.63
Alternatively, it could be that low-wage firms have a higher risk of
going out of business than better paying firms.64
This gap increases slightly as the displacement date approaches,
with the dip being significant only in the year immediately preceding
displacement, in which earnings of displaced workers are approxi-
mately 2.8 percent lower than they were five years before displace-
ment.  Workers who separate for reasons other than firm closure start
with earnings closer to the continuously employed (5.4 percent below),
but the preseparation dip starts sooner (three years prior to separation)
and is much larger, with earnings in the year preceding separation
being approximately 5.1 percent lower than they were five years before
separation.
Table 5.12 also shows that both displaced workers and other sepa-
rators make earnings gains between the year before separation and the
year after separation.  However, as suggested by Figure 5.3 and Table
5.10, there is a significant additional penalty to taking a long time to
find a job after separation.  For displaced workers, slow job finders
earn an extra 4.7 percent less than other displaced workers postsepara-
tion, while the penalty for slow job finding is more than twice as large
(10.1 percent) for workers who separate for other reasons.  The result
for displaced workers could be interpreted in the context of a declining
reservation wage, in which case workers who take longer to find jobs
would have, on average, lower reemployment wages.  On top of this
“penalty” comes an additional negative signal for workers who sepa-
rate for other reasons: For workers who take longer than a year to find
a new job, the separations are more likely to have been firings for cause
than voluntary quits, and thus these workers would receive, on average,
lower wage offers as the market infers that they have a lower value of
marginal product.
Finally, the earnings path in the postseparation period shows that,
on average, the gains made by workers around the separation date are
eliminated and become losses as time passes, so that displaced workers
five years after displacement are earning essentially the same as they
were earning in the year immediately preceding displacement.  The
postseparation decline is not as dramatic for workers who separate for
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other reasons.  Given the concave form of seniority returns in France,
such a pattern is surprising, since returns are steepest in the first few
years with an employer.65  This declining pattern may suggest that our
specification of a fixed-intercept shift in the postseparation period for
all slow job finders may not be a flexible enough functional form to
capture the heterogeneity in earnings that is correlated with the speed
of reentry into the labor market.66
Germany
Parameter estimates of Equation 2 for Germany, where we use the
sample of displaced workers and the year preceding displacement as
the reference earning level are displayed in Table 5.13.  All regressions
are tobit specifications, which take care of the top coding occurring in
our data.  The first column includes all workers who separate from a
plant that closes down within two years of the worker’s departure.  Rel-
ative to the workers’ average earnings in the year before a closure, dis-
placement leads to a 1–2 percent wage decrease in the years after
closure; four years after closure, their wage disadvantage relative to
their position before a closure becomes insignificant.  Workers who are
not observed in employment in the year after displacement face a per-
manent additional wage loss of about 19 percent.  Wages more than
one year before displacement do not vary much from wages in the pre-
displacement year.
We have run the same regression, using our alternative definitions
for displacement.  When considering a worker as displaced if he sepa-
rates from a firm within one year of the firm’s closing down (which
reduces the number of observations to 13,539), the permanent loss for
workers who have not rejoined the labor market in the year after dis-
placement is again 19 percent; the average wage loss in the three years
after displacement is 3 percent.  Using the third definition (contraction
by at least 40 percent), the respective numbers are 20 percent and 4.3
percent (this corresponds to 35,031 observations).  All these numbers
are fairly close, indicating that our results are quite robust to the defini-
tion of a displacement.
The second column in Table 5.13 reports results for displaced
workers who experienced a non-employment spell of at least six days
after separation.  The permanent effect of not having found a job in the
year after displacement reduces now to 12 percent (which is probably
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due to a change in average wages of the reference group).  Displace-
ment is associated with a wage loss in the first job in the year after dis-
placement of 4.1 percent, and of 2.0 percent two years after
displacement, both relative to wages in the year before displacement.
The difference becomes insignificant thereafter. 
These results, which are quite robust to different definitions of dis-
placement and different samples indicate that wage losses of displaced
workers relative to their predisplacement wages are fairly moderate.
Furthermore, there is a slight decline of wages in the three years
before separation.  As already indicated in Table 5.11, losses are sub-
stantial if the worker does not find a job in the year after separation.
In Table 5.13 we compare the wage position of a displaced worker
after displacement to his predisplacement wage.  Next, we estimate a
specification similar to the one underlying the results in Table 5.13,
where this time we pool displaced workers (or workers separated for
unknown reasons) and continuously employed workers.  We add an
additional indicator variable for the year immediately preceding dis-
placement.  This gives us the wage profile of displaced (separated)
workers, relative to continuously employed workers, in the years
before and after displacement.  Results are displayed in Table 5.14.
As already indicated in Figure 5.4, wages of displaced workers
are, on average, 10 percentage points lower than wages of continu-
ously employed workers.  This difference may be due to firm effects,
or may be a result of workers of lower quality selecting into firms
which close down.  The immediate pre- to post-wage difference is
again small—about 0.9 percent.  Compared with continuously
employed workers, displaced workers continue to have lower wages.
Again, those who are not in work in the year after displacement suffer
substantial permanent losses. 
The second column displays results for workers who separate
from their firm for unknown reasons.  Here, wages begin to decline
about two years before separation, but do not differ from those of con-
tinuously employed workers before that.  After separation, wages are
on average 4 percentage points lower, as compared to those of contin-
uously employed workers.  Again, workers who have not found a job
in the years after displacement suffer substantial losses.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this section, we bring together the results from the two countries
and briefly relate them to the existing literature from North American
studies of worker displacement.  It bears repeating that we focus on
prime-age men in stable jobs (at least four years of job seniority).  Fur-
thermore, our definition of displacement, used throughout this chapter,
is a separation within two years of firm closure in France and within
two years of plant closure in Germany.
Incidence
Worker displacement seems to be slightly more frequent in France
than in Germany.67 Among our sample of high-seniority workers, 2.78
percent experienced a displacement in France in 1984, whereas 6.71
percent of eligible German men had a displacement as their first sepa-
ration during the 1984–1990 window (a seven-year interval).  This sug-
gests that a lower bound on annual incidence of worker displacement
due to plant closures might be below 1 percent in Germany.  Both of
these numbers, and the German figures in particular, are lower than
what has been found for the United States; Farber (1997) found a prob-
ability of experiencing a displacement of 6.9 percent for the 1984–
1985 two-year period using the Displaced Worker Supplements of the
Current Population Survey.  However, this may be due largely to the
fact that Farber (1993) considered all self-reported displacements,
whereas (for data reasons) we restrict our attention to firm and plant
closures.68
As a share of total separations, worker displacements are more
important in France than in Germany.  Part of this difference may be
due to our different definitions of displacement (firm closure in France,
plant closure in Germany).
In both France and Germany, age is not significantly related to the
probability of displacement.  The highest levels of education are nega-
tively related to the probability of being displaced in both countries as
is seniority in 1984.  All of these results are generally consistent with
what has been found for the United States (Fallick 1996).
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Duration
In both France and Germany, a large share of displaced workers
transit to their subsequent employers without spending any time in
non-employment.  The share of direct transitions is always higher for
displaced workers than for workers who separate for other reasons, and
the share of displaced workers making direct transitions increases
slightly with seniority.  There is a larger share of direct transitions in
the German data than in the French data, which may be due to the dif-
ferences in the definitions of displacement (firm closure in France ver-
sus plant closure in Germany).
The durations of spells out of the workforce, when they occur, are
shorter in both countries for displaced workers than for those who sep-
arate for other reasons.  The long-term non-employment rate for dis-
placed workers in France seems slightly lower (around 20 percent after
five years) than that of Germany (around 27 percent), and the gap in
the survivor functions between displaced and other separating workers
is larger in Germany.  Recall that our administrative data suffer from
the problem of censoring—some individuals do not return into the
labor force after separating from their job within the observation win-
dow.  They may have changed into other states, like self-employment
(in Germany), or retirement, or they may have left the country.  There-
fore, one has to be cautious when interpreting these results as durations
in non-employment.
Estimations of duration models confirm the faster exit of displaced
workers in both countries.  However, displaced workers with high
seniority tend to leave non-employment more slowly than those with
low seniority in France, whereas the reverse is true in Germany.69
Earnings Changes
In both countries, we find a result that is contrary to the majority of
North American results on worker displacement.  Displacement does
not seem to be associated with large earnings losses.  In the French
case, average daily earnings of displaced workers actually increase,
relative to continuously employed workers, between the year preceding
and the year following displacement.  In Germany there is still a small
drop in average daily earnings relative to continuously employed
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workers, but the drop is less than 1 percent in relative earnings terms.
One explanation for our different results may be the way the earnings
variable is constructed: While we use data on daily earnings, which are
calculated using employment periods only, many North American
studies use data on quarterly or yearly earnings, without taking account
of the number of days worked.  Furthermore, some studies (Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993) substitute zero earnings for workers who
are not in work, while we construct our comparisons conditional on
employment.
We do find an important earnings differential associated with tak-
ing longer than a year to find a new job following displacement for
both countries.  In France, this corresponds to a 5 percent earnings dis-
advantage relative to other displaced workers who are reemployed
within the calendar year following displacement, while it is between 13
and 20 percent in relative terms in Germany.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the labor markets of France and Germany, although
different along certain dimensions, seem to provide roughly similar
outcomes for displaced workers.  One reason for these similarities may
be similar institutional regulations, like employment protection offered
by labor law.  Our analysis is purely descriptive and we have not
attempted to attribute findings, and differences from the North Ameri-
can literature, to differences in institutional regulations.  This is a
promising avenue for future research.
Notes
1. See, for example, Bonnal and Fougère (1993, 1996) for France, and Hunt (1995)
for Germany.
2. Note that our age selection criteria are designed to eliminate retirement as a desti-
nation after separation from one’s employer.
3. See Fallick (1996) for a survey.
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4. French labor law distinguishes between layoffs for economic reasons and layoffs
for personal reasons, such as inadequate performance or misconduct.
5. There are special considerations for large companies that lay off at least 10 people
over a 3-month period without passing the 10-people-in-30-day limit, but these
will not be treated here.
6. The links between the unemployment benefits schedules and eligibility require-
ments are quite complicated.  What is presented here is a short synopsis of the
important points of the unemployment insurance law prior to the substantial
reforms that took place in 1996.
7. A worker can qualify by satisfying any one of these criteria: a) 122 days or 676
hours of work over the 8 months preceding the end of the labor contract; b) 192
days or 1,014 hours of work over the 12 months preceding the end of the labor
contract; c) 243 days or 1,352 hours of work over the 12 months preceding the
end of the labor contract; d) 426 days or 2,366 hours of work over the 24 months
preceding the end of the labor contract; or 821 days or 4,563 hours of work over
the 36 months preceding the end of the labor contract.  The end of the labor con-
tract is defined as the last day of the notice period, regardless of whether this was
bought off or not.  Workers who become unemployed due to the closure of their
plant are not required to satisfy criterion “a.”  The levels and duration of benefits
vary according to the criterion satisfied, with the most difficult criterion, “e,” pro-
viding the highest benefits.  Criterion “e” entitles the worker to higher and longer
benefits than “b.”
8. Note that the eligibility rules for unemployment insurance give the worker the
incentive to declare all separations as involuntary, while the administrative proce-
dures described above give the firm the incentive to declare separations as volun-
tary.  This conflict of interest often introduces a bargaining situation in the case
where the employer intends to lay off a small number of workers.  The firm can
make side payments to the worker such that the worker declares the separation as
voluntary (if asked) and does not apply for unemployment benefits.  Anecdotal
evidence suggests that this is a relatively frequent phenomenon.
9. Note that, upon expiration of unemployment benefits, individuals may be eligible
for the Minimum Insertion Allowance (Revenu minimum d’insertion, or  RMI).
The RMI is a means-tested income support that has conditions and levels not
directly linked to unemployment duration, previous wages, or labor market histo-
ries.
10. See Margolis (1993) for a detailed discussion of the institutional context sur-
rounding contract extension in France, as well as an analysis of the implications
of contract extension for wage setting and firm participation in employers’ associ-
ations.
11. See Bughin (1985).
12. The inflation threshold was removed in 1970 with the reform that converted the
SMIG into the SMIC.
13. For a detailed analysis of the minimum wage in France, see Abowd, Kramarz,
Margolis, and Philippon (2000).
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14. It has been complemented by the Arbeitsschutzbereinigungsgesetz (1969), the
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (1972), and the Gesetz zur Anderung des KSchG
(1978), among others.
15. The differential treatment of blue- and white-collar workers was abolished in
October 1993.  We report here the regulations that were in force up to 1993, since
our data covers the period up to 1990.
16. If an unemployed person fulfills the above criteria, the minimum period of eligi-
bility is 156 days.  Depending on the duration of contribution payments and the
age of the applicant, this period can be extended to up to 832 days (see Kittner
1995, p. 192, for details).
17. An exhaustive DADS data set file does exist for use primarily by the tax authori-
ties, but we were only given access to the 1/25 sample.
18. Note that these data include self-employed workers who pay themselves salaries.
Self-employed workers who act as pure residual claimants will not be included.
Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to separate self-employed wage earners
from other wage earners.
19. Our earnings data are available as 8-byte numeric variables and are subject to nei-
ther top nor bottom coding.  All labor earnings are reported.
20. See Abowd, Finer, Kramarz, and Roux (1997) for details.  Given that our analysis
sample begins in 1984 and that we consider seniority as a categorical variable for
which the largest category is more than 10  years, our results are robust to most
estimation error in the job start date due to the imputation for the left-censored
spells.
21. For individuals for whom EDP data are not available, we use a multinomial logit
to impute the probability that the individual had each of the educational degrees
possible.  See the data appendix of Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis, and Philippon
(1999) for more details.
22. From 1988–1992 (1990 excluded), INSEE introduced two variables distinguish-
ing whether the observation corresponded to a plant that had ceased to exist as an
“economic” or “administrative” entity.  The main difference between these vari-
ables is that firms occasionally continue to exist “administratively,” but with zero
workers, after their “economic” death.  The manner by which mergers and acqui-
sitions affect the plant identifier in our data is rather involved.  Unfortunately,
these data have serious inconsistencies, as individuals whose observations corre-
spond to the economic or administrative death of their plant in the year t are just
as likely to still be employed by the plant, and receiving a salary, in the year t + 1
as they are to have separated from the plant.  Thus we do not consider these vari-
ables informative for the analysis of worker displacements.
23. Our approach to defining displacements is based on a combination of firm
account data and payroll data.  An alternative approach, such as considering sepa-
rations that occur simultaneously with large reductions in firm employment as
displacements (see Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993), is not feasible with
our data, as firm employment is not available for all employees at all dates.
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24. The SUSE data used here are a sample of enterprises in France with differential
sampling probabilities based on reporting requirements which vary with employ-
ment (the largest firms appear with probability 1).  Depending on the size of the
firm and the type of accounts it sends to the relevant regulating and tax authori-
ties, information may be available on a detailed balance sheet, income statement,
and flow-of-funds statement.  The smaller enterprises are not required to provide
as much detailed information.  Here we use the presence of any information on
the firm as a sign of its continued existence.  Therefore, we do not lose firms when
they pass below the threshold for providing detailed accounts.
25. For separations in years prior to 1996, the firm clearly continues to exist, as work-
ers employed by it are observed.  For 1996, we are unable to determine whether
the firm will disappear in 1997.  These observations could theoretically be consid-
ered displacements, but given our eventual sample selection restrictions (see
below), the question of how to classify these observations is moot.
26. The requirement that there be at least three observed employees means that, in
expectation, the corresponding firm has at least 75 employees.  It prevents us from
arbitrarily classifying all departures from small firms as false firm deaths.  On the
other hand, it may cause us to miss all false firm deaths among the smallest firms
in our sample.  Unfortunately, given that we only have access to the 1/25 sample
of employment, we cannot improve upon the treatment for small firms beyond the
SUSE sampling scheme.  SUSE data are available from financial reports that are
mandatory for firms with total sales of at least 500,000 F per year (or at least
150,000 F per year for firms in service industries) and are optional for all others.
27. We are grateful to Peter Kuhn for suggesting this algorithm.
28. We consider the year preceding the year of firm death since, with SUSE data at
least, we do not know the precise date within the year at which the firm ceased
operations.  Furthermore, a firm whose fiscal year ends after June 30 of the year
t + 1 will have year t + 1 SUSE information, even if operations ceased in year t.
29. Results based on the more strict definition of displacement, considering only
those separations occurring within one year of firm disappearance, are available
upon request.  A table indicative of the importance of the definitional differences
can be found in Appendix B.
30. There exist other data sources that allow us to identify layoffs at the plant level
and to classify them by type (economic or personal reasons).  However, these data
do not allow us to tell which workers are among those laid off, and they are sub-
ject to an even more restrictive sampling scheme than the SUSE data.  One possi-
ble avenue for future research might assign a probability that a separation
corresponds to a layoff for economic reasons, as opposed to relying on a simple
indicator variable to denote that reason for each separation.
31. Margolis (1999) and Margolis (2000) treat both men and women.
32. Because of the complex interplay between youth employment-promotion schemes
(for which eligibility ends at 25 years of age) and the minimum wage in France
(see Abowd, Kramarz, Lemieux, and Margolis 2000), we begin considering indi-
viduals after they become 26 years old.
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33. Note that this does not mean that there will be no workers with seniority of less
than four years in our data.  In particular, for the earnings-change models, we use
postseparation information during which workers who have experienced a separa-
tion will typically have less than four years of seniority.
34. This latter constraint eliminates 15.2 percent of the individuals from the DADS
and 16.7 percent of the individual-year combinations that satisfy our eligibility
criterion (26- to 50-year-old men with at least four years of seniority in some job
in 1984).  In particular, 32.7 percent of the yearly observations corresponding to
workers whose first separation was a displacement, and 28.6 percent of the yearly
observations of workers whose first separation was for other reasons, are elimi-
nated due to the restriction against simultaneous job holding.  This may bias our
results.  Similar models that allow for simultaneous job holding are estimated in
Margolis (1999, 2000).
35. Note that the entire, nonselected sample was used in the determination of firm
“death” dates.
36. In order to give a more accurate picture of the incidence of worker displacement,
we consider all separations in our sample.  Considering only first separations
would severely underestimate the incidence of worker displacement in the later
years of our sample.
37. The duration analyses are based on data with one observation per individual, cor-
responding to the first separation observed in our sample window.
38. As our data do not allow us to measure revenues from non-labor-market sources,
our earnings measure is available only for years in which labor market earnings
are strictly positive.
39. It should be noted, however, that using such a measure can obscure the role of
part-time employment on earnings (Farber 1999).  Margolis (1999) shows how
conclusions concerning earnings movements are sensitive to the earnings mea-
sure, in particular by comparing log(annual earnings) with log(daily earnings)
measures.
40. Accordingly, the sample is left-truncated and right-censored.  The truncation
refers to the lowest level of earnings for which social security contributions are
obligatory; the right-censoring refers to the highest level of earnings subject to
contributions.
41. While we observe separations of workers at the exact date of occurrence, informa-
tion on plant size is measured at a fixed date each year.  Plant size refers to
employment in June of the relevant year.  Accordingly, the time of closure cannot
be exactly dated.
42. Recall that we are looking only at permanent separations in this chapter and that
individuals who spend less than a full calendar year on temporary layoff are not
therefore considered as separators.
43. The discussion that follows supposes that the separations attributed to 1989 were
more or less evenly distributed between 1989 and 1990.
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44. Recall that we are using separations in the two calendar years preceding the calen-
dar year in which the firm identified disappears as our criterion for distinguishing
displacements from other separations.
45. Women in France are guaranteed eight weeks of maternity leave by law, of which
two are indented to be taken before childbirth and six after.  However, collective
agreements often extend the durations of available maternity leave, sometimes to
16 weeks or more.  Furthermore, the employment relation is not interrupted
because of maternity leave, and the woman is guaranteed a comparable position to
the one she left upon returning from maternity leave.
46. These results concerning incidence of displacement are comparable to the studies
cited by  Fallick (1996), who noted that job seniority was negatively related to the
incidence of displacement in the United States.
47. The fact that the share of displacements in total separations is lower for 50- to 55-
year-olds than for 35- to 40-year-olds suggests that the phenomenon generating
the additional separations is not necessarily linked to firm closure.
48. Appendix G presents the results of a similar estimation, but there the reference
group is only those workers who remain continuously employed with the same
employer throughout the 1984–1989 sample window.
49. Our distinction between displaced and separated workers refers to the reason for
the first separation after being in continuous employment between 1980 and 1984.
50. Recall that separation status refers to the first separation only.
51. In France, we treat all spells that do not end before December 31, 1989, as cen-
sored.
52. Informal discussions with ASSEDIC administrators suggest that, in 1998 at least,
approximately one-third of individuals drawing unemployment insurance
exhausted their benefits.  These figures are roughly consistent with the survivor
function measured a decade earlier and shown in Figure 5.1.
53. The estimated Kaplan-Meier hazards underlying Figure 5.1 are roughly linear and
decreasing in the log of the hazard rate, which suggests that a Weibull-distributed
baseline hazard is the most appropriate parametric specification.  Semiparametric
(Cox) models were not estimable under the material constraints (memory alloca-
tion and CPU time) imposed by INSEE.
54. Note that, since the parameter estimates refer to the proportionality factor in the
hazard function, a positive coefficient means that higher levels of the correspond-
ing variable are associated with higher values of the hazard function and thus
shorter expected non-employment durations.
55. Benefit payments are proportional to the most recent earnings prior to separation.
56. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), on the other hand, supposed that work-
ers not in employment after separation had zero earnings and kept these workers
in the sample for the calculation of their average earnings changes.
57. Note that the earnings change for other separators combines individuals who left
their jobs for better outside offers with workers who were fired for cause and
workers who were laid off from firms that did not shut down within the following
two calendar years.
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58. One might ask why displaced workers did not leave earlier if they were going to
have such large earnings gains associated with changing employers.  There are
several possible explanations.  First, the employment-protection legislation pro-
vided them with job security with their previous employer that they stood to lose
if they changed earlier.  The prospect of imminent firm closure reduced the value
of this nonwage component of job-specific utility, however, thus making outside
offers relatively more attractive.  A second possible explanation is that the offer
arrival rate for on-the-job search may be lower than that for off-the-job search (or
search during the notice period).  In this case, workers whose first separation was
a displacement may simply not have received another offer prior to their separa-
tion.  A third explanation is that 1988 was a good year for the French economy,
with 3.95 percent GDP growth, relative to an average of 1.51 percent over the
1984–1987 period (BLS Macroeconomic Statistics, http://stats.bls.gov/fls-
data.htm).  As such, there may have been better outside offers in 1988 than in ear-
lier years.  Finally, since postdisplacement wages are only measured for
reemployed workers, the sample of workers contributing to the 1986 and 1988
averages are not the same.  In particular, the set of workers employed in 1988 may
not be representative of all workers displaced in 1987.
59. Our estimation strategy resembles that of Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
(1993).
60. For France, the reference year is five years prior to separation.  For Germany (see
Table 5.13), it is the year immediately preceding separation.
61. See Margolis (1999) for estimates of this model using log(total annual earnings)
as the dependent variable.  Margolis (2000) estimated a similar model but with
individual fixed effects.
62. Note that, for a given coefficient β on a regressor x in Tables 5.12–5.14, _log(y) =
βx.  To calculate the percentage change in y induced by x, i.e., (yt + 1 – yt)/yt, one
typically makes use of the approximation log(1 + x) = x.  This approximation is
not valid when x is far from zero, and thus the coefficients are not directly inter-
pretable as percentage changes in the dependent variable.  For this reason, we
have used the exact  formula, i.e., (yt + 1 – yt)/yt = exp(β) – 1, in the discussion of
these tables.
63 See Margolis (1999) for further analyses in this direction.
64. Abowd et al. (1999) show that the firm-specific component of earnings is nega-
tively related to the probability of firm survival on the same DADS and SUSE
data, but the estimates are relatively imprecise.
65. See Margolis (1996) for a detailed analysis of returns to seniority in France.
66. Margolis (2000) estimated a similar specification with individual fixed effects on
a data set that does not eliminate individuals with simultaneous job holding and
found that the size of the postseparation decline in average daily earnings was
reduced, but not eliminated.  One alternative strategy, as used by Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), might be to include all workers in the postsepara-
tion period, but to attribute zero earnings to workers who have yet to find jobs.
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67. A word of warning is necessary when comparing our results for incidence.  The
figures for France refer to the number of individuals who experience a type of
separation per year, while the numbers for Germany refer to the number of indi-
viduals whose first separation in a seven-year period is of a given type.  Thus, the
figures are not directly comparable; nevertheless, we attempt to draw some con-
clusions below.
68. Given that the Displaced Worker Supplements are survey based, they may be sub-
ject to measurement error as a result of individuals misreporting firings for cause
as layoffs.
69. As a comparison, Swaim and Podgursky (1991) found that the rate of exit from
non-employment among displaced workers decreased with seniority in the United
States.















1984 99,479 8,309 2,821 5,584 8.35 2.84
1985 95,842 8,620 3,487 5,244 8.99 3.64
1986 93,009 8,730 3,365 5,478 9.39 3.62
1987 91,458 10,517 3,633 7,000 11.63 4.02
1988 86,479 8,439 3,557 5,006 9.73 4.10
1989 85,317 15,459 6,349 9,380 18.12 7.44
Σ 550,854 60,074 23,212 37,649 10.91 4.21
Women
1984 57,595 5,274 2,142 3,172 9.16 3.72
1985 54,588 5,113 2,044 3,119 9.37 3.74
1986 52,267 5,275 2,245 3,069 10.09 4.30
1987 50,226 5,094 1,895 3,242 10.14 3.77
1988 48,699 4,790 1,888 2,961 9.84 3.88
1989 47,465 8,184 3,301 5,010 17.24 6.95
Σ 310,840 33,730 13,515 20,573 10.85 4.35
NOTE: Long tenure = four or more years.
a Multiple observations in the same year are aggregated to the unique individual-year level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
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4 ≤ Seniority < 6 19,920 2,488 728 1,760 12.49 3.65 29.26
6 ≤ Seniority < 8 24,026 2,235 753 1,482 9.30 3.13 33.69
8 ≤ Seniority <10 2,791 259 124 135 9.28 4.44 47.88
≤ 10 Seniority 52,742 3,327 1,163 2,164 6.31 2.21 34.96
Σ 99,479 8,309 2,768 5,541 8.35 2.78 33.31
25 ≤ Age < 30 11,963 1,135 406 752 9.49 3.39 35.77
30 ≤ Age <35 26,154 2,267 765 1,523 8.67 2.92 33.75
35 ≤ Age < 40 19,431 1,553 539 1,034 7.99 2.77 34.71
40 ≤ Age <45 20,400 1,560 528 1,043 7.65 2.59 33.85
45 ≤ Age < 50 14,322 1,112 351 774 7.76 2.45 31.56
50 ≤ Age < 55 7,209 682 232 458 9.46 3.22 34.02
Σ 99,479 8,309 2,821 5,584 8.35 2.84 33.95
NOTE: Multiple observations in the same year are aggregated to the unique individual-year level.  Numbers refer to the 1984 data year.
a Of these individuals, 96 experienced both displacements and other separations in 1984.  Only the first separation is counted in the dis-
placements and other separations columns in the top half of the table, as the second separations are (by design) from low-seniority jobs.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
428Table 5.3 Probit Models of Incidence of Separation, Total and by Type of Separation Relative to All Alternative 
States for France in 1984
Variable Displacements Other separations All separations
Age –0.0048 (0.0136) –0.0077 (0.0108) –0.0065 (0.0096)
Age2/100 0.0081 (0.0177) 0.0146 (0.0139) 0.0126 (0.0124)
4 ≤ Seniority < 6 0.1400*** (0.0224) 0.3563*** (0.0178) 0.3236*** (0.0155)
6 ≤ Seniority <8 0.1016*** (0.0215) 0.1849*** (0.0170) 0.1784*** (0.0150)
8 ≤ Seniority < 10 0.1378*** (0.0463) 0.0194 (0.0436) 0.0884** (0.0362)
Elementary school –0.0895 (0.0689) –0.0047 (0.0550) –0.0326 (0.0487)
Junior high school 0.0918 (0.1020) 0.0185 (0.0852) 0.0584 (0.0743)
High school 0.1011 (0.1262) 0.1022 (0.1013) 0.0783 (0.0912)
Basic vocational school –0.0748 (0.0658) –0.1150** (0.0541) –0.1113** (0.0474)
Advanced vocational school –0.2412** (0.1184) –0.0812 (0.0846) –0.1472* (0.0767)
Undergraduate 0.1072 (0.1185) 0.1829** (0.0911) 0.1787** (0.0821)
Graduate school and 
grande école
–0.0696 (0.1114) 0.3318*** (0.0772) 0.2452*** (0.0711)
Constant –2.2219*** (0.2755) –1.6680*** (0.2144) –1.5684*** (0.1911)
No. of obs. 99,479 99,479 99,479
Log likelilhood –12,251 –20,886 –27,552
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates include data from 1984 only, aggregated to one observation per individual.  All
models also include controls for previous seniority, sector (15 categories) and skill level (3 categories).  Reference groups: No educa-
tional certification and 10 or more years of seniority.  Models estimate probability of specified type of separation relative to all alterna-
tive situations.  *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically signiticant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at
the 10% level..
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Table 5.4 Breakdown of Separations by Type and Seniority for Germany
Variable
 Continuously 
employed  Total  Other separations  Displacements
Displaced (%)
 In separations In total
4 ≤ Seniority < 6   5,246 4,285 3,596 689  16.07  7.23
6 ≤ Seniority < 8   4,505 3,009 2,395 614  20.40  8.17
8 ≤ Seniority < 10  8,539 4,913 3,806 1,107  22.53  8.23
10 ≤ Seniority       14,304 3,999 3,136 863  21.58  4.72
Σ                32,594 16,206 12,933 3,273  20.19  6.71
25 ≤ Age < 30        4,066 2,686 2,214 472  17.57  6.99
30 ≤ Age < 40       10,746 5,921 4,795 1,126  19.01  6.76
40 ≤ Age < 50       14,830 6,243 4,870 1,373  21.99  6.52
50 ≤ Age            2,952 1,356 1,054 302  22.27  7.01
Σ 32,594 16,206 12,933 3,273  20.19  6.71
NOTE: Seniority and age refer to 1984.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from IAB data.
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Table 5.5 Probability of Displacement or Separation between 1984 and 
1990 in Germany—Marginal Effects
 Variable   Displacements Other separations
Age/100     0.005  (0.020)  –0.238***  (0.030)
5 ≤ Seniority <7            0.003  (0.004) –0.039***  (0.006)
7 ≤ Seniority <9            –0.014***  (0.003) –0.088***  (0.005)
9 ≤ Seniority              –0.035***  (0.003)  –0.153***  (0.005)
Apprentice, no high school   0.008***  (0.003) –0.006  (0.005)
No apprentice, high school   –0.023  (0.019)  0.052  (0.032)
Apprentice, high school      0.016  (0.015)  0.046**  (0.020)
Polytechnic   –0.028***  (0.007)  0.061*** (0.012)
University  –0.018**  (0.009)  0.141*** (0.014)
Education unknown           0.026***  (0.008)  0.053*** (0.011)
Sector
2: Energy                 –0.085*** (0.001) –0.189  (0.014)
3: Mining   –0.062*** (0.005)  0.119*** (0.031)
4: Manufacturing          –0.146   (0.012)  –0.092*** (0.022)
5: Construction          –0.038***  (0.007)  –0.001  (0.023)
6: Distributional services  –0.063*** (0.006)  –0.004 (0.023)
7: Industry services      –0.078*** (0.003)  –0.055**  (0.021)
8: Consumer services      –0.069*** (0.003)  –0.081*** (0.024)
9: Public services        –0.101***  (0.003)  –0.112*** (0.019)
No. of obs.  36,689  44,402
Probability  0.086 0.244
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  All estimations refer to 1983. Excluded cat-
egories: agricultural sector,  no apprenticeship, no high school and 3 ≤ seniority <5.
Comparison group: continuously employed in same plant, 1984–1990.  *** = Statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from IAB data.
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Table 5.6 Non-Employment Spells after First Separation by Seniority in France








4 ≤ Seniority < 6 1,699 85.40 437 79.63 1,262 87.40
6 ≤ Seniority < 8 2,912 84.38 802 81.92 2,110 85.31
8 ≤ Seniority <10 2,685 83.99 762 82.94 1,923 84.40
10 ≤ Seniority 8,998 79.06 2,406 74.44 6,592 80.75
Σ 16,294 81.48 4,407 77.79 11,887 82.86
NOTE: Statistics include only first separations and impose the retirement constraint (see text).
a Total number of separations, by seniority.
b Number of displacements.
c Number of other separations.
d Percentage of non-employment spells in total.
e Percentage of displacements that are followed by a positive-duration non-employment spell.
f Percentage of other separations that are followed by a positive-duration non-employment spell.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
432Table 5.7 Weibull Proportional Hazard Models for Return to Work for France
Variable All separations Separated for unknown reason Displaced
Constant –1.4272*** (0.2757) –1.5000*** (0.3018) 0.3903 (205.6546)
6 ≤ Seniority < 8 –0.4538*** (0.1306) –0.4079*** (0.1429) –0.5210*** (0.1772)
8 ≤ Seniority < 10 –0.4928*** (0.1389) –0.4261*** (0.1528) –0.5817*** (0.1858)
10 ≤ Seniority –0.4807*** (0.1276) –0.4106*** (0.1398) –0.5827*** (0.1719)
Firm closure 0.2081** (0.1049) n.a.a — n.a. —
Age 0.0080 (0.0286) 0.0064 (0.0317) 0.0102 (0.0382)
Elementary school 0.2461 (0.2101) 0.3020 (0.2333) 0.1395 (0.2776)
Junior high school 0.2906 (0.2570) 0.4343 (0.2743) –0.0313 (0.3860)
High school 0.6020** (0.2685) 0.6739** (0.2967) 0.5216 (0.3601)
Basic vocational 
school
0.3829* (0.2042) 0.5054** (0.2287) 0.1283 (0.2670)
Advanced vocational 
school
0.4219* (0.2530) 0.5048* (0.2708) 0.2810 (0.3744)
Undergraduate 1.0114*** (0.2611) 1.4623*** (0.2940) 0.1666 (0.3535)
Graduate school and 
grande école
0.6371*** (0.2459) 0.6628** (0.2679) 0.5379 (0.3411)
1985 –0.0187 (0.1192) –0.0825 (0.1307) 0.1043 (0.1633)
1986 0.1601 (0.1267) 0.0811 (0.1381) 0.3163* (0.1746)
1987 0.2202* (0.1302) 0.1505 (0.1422) 0.3519** (0.1782)
1988 0.1938 (0.1395) 0.1367 (0.1529) 0.2986 (0.1897)
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No. of obs. 13,838 10,136 3,702
No. of failures 8,350 5,698 2,652
Log likelihood –25,938 –18,134 –7,701
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Right censoring occurs when the individual is not reemployed by December 31, 1989.  All
models include controls for sector of preseparation firm (15 categories) and skill level (3 categories).  Reference groups: 1984, 4–6
years of seniority, and no educational certification. *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5%
level; * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
a n.a. = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
434Table 5.8 Non-Employment Spells after Separation by Seniority in Germany








4 ≤ Seniority < 6      1,749  54.94  281 51.60 1,468  55.58
6 ≤ Seniority < 8      2,422  50.28  458  46.28  1,964  51.22
8 ≤ Seniority < 10     3,977  52.07  863  44.38  3,114  54.30
10 ≤ Seniority         8,043  46.15  16,721  33.01  6,371  49.59
Σ  16,191  49.16  3,274  39.46  12,917  51.62
a Total number of separations, by seniority. 
b Number of displacements.
c Number of separations.
d Percentage of non-employment spells in total. 
e Percentage of displacements that are followed by positive-duration non-employment spells.
f Percentage of separations that are followed by positive-duration non-employment spells.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from IAB data. 
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Table 5.9 Cox Models for Return to Work for Germany 
Variable All separations Separated for unknown reason Displaced
Age/100                     –3.1258***  (0.2257) –3.5590***  (0.2599) –1.8075***  (0.4644)
6 ≤ Seniority < 8         0.0310  (0.0571) 0.0293  (0.0641) 0.0801  (0.1286)
8 ≤ Seniority < 10        0.0641  (0.0532) 0.0340  (0.0602) 0.2053*  (0.1178)
10 ≤ Seniority            –0.0217 (0.0617) –0.1062 (0.0703)  0.2880**  (0.1324)
Closure      0.4035*** (0.0388) n.a.a            —       n.a.            —
Apprentice, no high school  0.3749***  (0.0407) 0.4084*** (0.046)  0.2669***  (0.0826)
No apprentice, high school  0.1485  (0.3041) 0.1886 (0.3367) –0.0092  (0.7159)
Apprentice, high school     0.0099 (0.1709) 0.3215 (0.1936) –0.6717*  (0.3636)
Polytechnic                 0.1972 (0.1309) 0.3311** (0.1421)  –0.2354  (0.3427)
University                  0.0879 (0.1276) 0.1994 (0.1302)  –1.8720*  (1.0043)
Education unknown           0.0524 (0.0721) 0.0764 (0.0842) –0.0361  (0.1404)
1985      0.1230*** (0.0486)  0.1528*** (0.0565)  0.0886  (0.0967)
1986     0.2224*** (0.0549)  0.2278*** (0.0629)  0.2249**  (0.1143)
1987      0.1694*** (0.0621)  0.2408*** (0.0709)  –0.0342  (0.1305)
1988                         0.1709*** (0.0696)  0.2146*** (0.0796)  0.0635  (0.1438)
1989                         0.1533** (0.0784)  0.2347*** (0.0884) –0.0739  (0.1734)
1990     –0.0167 (0.1027) –0.0879 (0.1171)  0.6807**  (0.2101)
(continued)
436Table 5.9 (continued)
Variable All separations Separated for unknown reason Displaced
No. of obs.  5,019 3,998 1,021
No. of  failures           3,720 2,813  907
Log likelihood      –28,924 –21,269 –5,558
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Right censoring occurs when the individual is not reemployed by December 1990.  Reference
group: no apprenticeship, no high school.  *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; *
= statistically significant at the 10% level.
a n.a. = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from IAB data.
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Group %Δw Obs. %Δw Obs. %Δw Obs. %Δw Obs. %Δw Obs.
4≤ Seniority < 6         4.70 13,712 16.62 825 –9.34 175 10.43 1,521 –12.02 349
6 ≤ Seniority < 8 4.38 35,453 12.22 1,642 1.48 213 8.91 2,180 –25.92 531
8≤ Seniority < 10      3.55 31,659 13.51 1,375 –3.67 154 10.05 1,464 –11.04 238
10 ≤ Seniority 2.58 138,298 9.87 4,708 –6.07 441 3.37 4,194 –23.56 556
Σ 3.15 219,122 11.88 8,550 –4.64 983 6.85 9,359 –20.12 1,674
NOTE: Data correspond to one observation per individual per year.
a “Slow” refers to individuals who were not reemployed in the calendar year following the separation.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
438Table 5.11 Two-Period Log Earnings Growth, by Seniority at Date of First Separation for Germany
Group  Displaced    Displaced Ia Displaced IIb Separated Separated Ic Cont. employed
Seniority %Δw
 No. 
obs. %Δw  No. obs. %Δw  No. obs. %Δw  No. obs. %Δw  No. obs. %Δw  No. obs.
4 ≤  Seniority < 6      2.44 242   –20.43  15  0.83  89  4.58  1,048  –8.21  102  3.50  12,603
6 ≤  Seniority < 8      5.74  397   7.04  22  2.60  111  4.31  1,422  –12.72  107  3.98   22,305
8≤  Seniority < 10      1.93  737   –3.42  41 –2.10  190  2.94  1,979  –13.07  135  4.82   50,482
10 ≤  Seniority          2.36  1,288  –15.45  34  –3.57  254  2.46  3,273  –23.66  113  3.14  167,374
Σ                   2.75  2,665  –7.29  112  –1.46  644  3.21  7,730  –14.24 458  4.64  255,331
a Workers who have not found a job in the year after displacement. 
b Workers who experience a non-employment spell of at least one week after displacement. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 5.12 Log Average Real Daily Earnings Regressions for France 
Variable Displacements Other separations
Separateda –0.0917*** (0.0068) –0.0553*** (0.0060)
Sep-4b –0.0042 (0.0084) –0.0035 (0.0075)
Sep-3 –0.0121 (0.0080) –0.0230*** (0.0069)
Sep-2 –0.0124 (0.0077) –0.0256*** (0.0067)
Sep-1 –0.0281*** (0.0075) –0.0520*** (0.0066)
Permc –0.0479*** (0.0109) –0.1061*** (0.0069)
Sep1 0.1265*** (0.0080) 0.1349*** (0.0073)
Sep2 0.0377*** (0.0082) 0.0255*** (0.0075)
Sep3 0.0196** (0.0086) –0.0137* (0.0077)
Sep4 –0.0049 (0.0094) –0.0187** (0.0083)
Sep5 –0.0250** (0.0115) –0.0162* (0.0098)
Age 0.0465*** (0.0010) 0.0472*** (0.0010)
Age2/100 –0.0440*** (0.0012) –0.0448*** (0.0012)
1985 –0.0004 (0.0022) –0.0006 (0.0022)
1986 0.0081*** (0.0022) 0.0106*** (0.0022)
1987 –0.0081*** (0.0022) –0.0050** (0.0023)
1988 –0.0045* (0.0023) –0.0044* (0.0023)
1989 0.0016 (0.0023) –0.0025 (0.0024)
Elementary
school
0.0553*** (0.0053) 0.0439*** (0.0055)
Junior high 
school
0.2207*** (0.0080) 0.2151*** (0.0082)
High school 0.3447*** (0.0096) 0.3533*** (0.0100)
Basic vocational 
school
0.1357*** (0.0051) 0.1180*** (0.0053)
Advanced
vocational school
0.2807*** (0.0075) 0.2677*** (0.0077)
Undergraduate 0.4108*** (0.0092) 0.4018*** (0.0093)
Graduate school 
and grande école
1.0866*** (0.0081) 1.0687*** (0.0081)
Constant –2.8427*** (0.0205) –2.8827*** (0.0210)
(continued)
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Table 5.12 (continued)
Variable Displacements Other separations
No. of obs. 402,174 433,627
R2 0.3608 0.3339
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Reference groups = 1984 and no educa-
tional certification.  *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically
significant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
a Separated = 1 for all observations corresponding to individuals who separate at some
point between 1984 and 1989.
b The Sepi variables equal 1 in the ith year before or after separation.
c Perm = 1 for observations after separation if time between the two jobs exceeded one
year.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
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Table 5.13 Earnings Regressions for Censored Regression Models for 
Germany: Displaced Workers Only
Variable  All Non-employment spella
Sep–6b                     –0.0029  (0.0222) –0.0403  (0.0691)
Sep–5                     0.0023  (0.0142) –0.0586  (0.0390)
Sep–4                      0.0275***  (0.0113) 0.0231  (0.0282)
Sep–3                     0.0156  (0.0098) 0.0217  (0.0227)
Sep–2                     0.0062  (0.0088) 0.0052  (0.0196)
Permc                        –0.2159***  (0.0170) –0.1310***  (0.0191)
Sep1  –0.0161** (0.0080) –0.0414***  (0.0176)
Sep2                       –0.0222***  (0.0086) –0.0207  (0.0190)
Sep3                       –0.0246***  (0.0093) –0.0015  (0.0207)
Sep4                       –0.0121  (0.0103) 0.0280  (0.0225)
Sep5                       –0.0103  (0.0118) 0.0415*  (0.0250)
Sep6                       –0.0280  (0.0156) 0.0411 (0.0317)
Age   6.2292***  (0.3114) 5.4975***  (0.6326)
Age2/100                   –6.9903***  (0.3771) –6.3207***  (0.7638)
1985                       0.0002  (0.0086) –0.0097  (0.0185)
1986                        0.0355***  (0.0090) 0.0308  (0.0196)
1987   0.0733***  (0.0095) 0.0561***  (0.0209)
1988   0.1045*** (0.0100)  0.0654***  (0.0223)
1989                        0.1140***  (0.0106)  0.0560***  (0.0234)
1990   0.1165***  (0.0113) 0.0647***  (0.0251)
Apprentice, no high 
school
 0.1892***  (0.0056) 0.1722***  (0.0108)
No apprentice, high 
school
0.4315 — 0.3151***  (0.1262)
Apprentice, high 
school
 0.3751***  (0.0222) 0.1775***  (0.0512)
Polytechnic                 0.6356***  (0.0194) 0.4961***  (0.0611)
University   0.6990***  (0.0231) 0.7647***  (0.0813)
Education unknown           0.0893***  (0.0095)  0.0602***  (0.0183)
Constant   2.8313*** (0.0630)  2.9633***  (0.1275)
(continued)
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Table 5.13 (continued)
Variable  All Non-employment spella
No. of obs.  19,018  4,995
Pseudo R2  0.295 0.176
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Base education group = no apprentice, no
high school degree.  *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically
significant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
a Spell = at least six days after separation.
b Perm = 1 for observations after separation if time between the two jobs exceeded one
year.
c The Sepi variables equal 1 in the ith year after separation.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
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Table 5.14 Earnings Regressions for Censored Regression Models for 
Germany
Variable Displaced Separated
Sep–6   –0.118*** (0.0177)  0.020*** (0.0089)
Sep–5   –0.107*** (0.0107)  0.014*** (0.0059)
Sep–4   –0.084*** (0.0082)  0.008* (0.0047)
Sep–3   –0.095*** (0.0068)  –0.002 (0.0040)
Sep–2                      –0.105*** (0.0058)  –0.007 (0.0034)
Sep–1  –0.112*** (0.0050)  –0.021*** (0.0029)
Perma                       –0.217*** (0.0150)  –0.289*** (0.0074)
Sep1b                       –0.121*** (0.0045)  –0.047*** (0.0027)
Sep2  –0.125*** (0.0049)  –0.040*** (0.0030)
Sep3                       –0.124*** (0.0054)  –0.041*** (0.0033)
Sep4                       –0.110*** (0.0061)  –0.034***  (0.0037)
Sep5                       –0.101*** (0.0074)  –0.040***  (0.0045)
Sep6                       –0.110*** (0.0108)  –0.050*** (0.0063)
Age        0.051*** (0.0007)  0.055***  (0.0006)
Age2/100  –0.055*** (0.0008)  –0.060*** (0.0008)
1985       0.015*** (0.0019)  0.016*** (0.0018)
1986       0.053*** (0.0019)  0.055*** (0.0018)
1987       0.080 *** (0.0019)  0.083*** (0.0018)
1988       0.116*** (0.0019)  0.122*** (0.0018)
1989       0.111 *** (0.0019)  0.117 *** (0.0018)
1990       0.100 *** (0.0019)  0.104*** (0.0019)
Apprentice, no high 
school
 0.175*** (0.0012)  0.184*** (0.0012)
No apprentice, high 
school
 0.330*** (0.0081)  0.341*** (0.0075)
Apprentice, high 
school
 0.408*** (0.0050)  0.434*** (0.0045)
Polytechnic    0.549*** (0.0031)  0.571*** (0.0029)
University    0.604*** (0.0038)  0.625*** (0.0033)
Education unknown           0.080*** (0.0026)  0.082*** (0.0025)
(continued)
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Table 5.14 (continued)
Variable Displaced Separated
Constant    3.143*** (0.0150)  3.045*** (0.0140)
No. of obs.                     267,044  323,916
Pseudo R2                  0.4950  0.4255
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Base education group = no apprentice, no
high school degree.  *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; * = statistically
significant at the 10% level.
a Perm = 1 for observations after separation if time between the two jobs exceeded one
year. 




Correction for False Firm Deaths in France
Suppose we observe n1 workers associated with firm j1 in the last available
year for the firm (prior to 1996), and a share  were observed the following
year in firm jk ,   Using  p1k as an estimator of  , the true share of work-
ers moving from firm j1 to firm jk, we take a normal approximation to the un-
derlying binomial distribution under which the standard error of p1k is σ1k =
.  Thus, if for any k, , p1k + 2σ1k ≥ 0.5, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that at least 50 percent of the firm’s workforce moved together to
the same successor firm (  ≥ 0.5) at the 95 percent confidence level.  If this
is the case for any , we consider only separations to firms for which we
can reject ≥ 0.5, i.e., for which < 0.5, to be real separations.
All of these are classified as separations for reasons other than displacement,
since there is at least one possible successor firm to j1.  All changes in firm
identifier for individuals moving to firm with ≥ 0.5 are consid-
ered to be false firm deaths, and are not coded as separations.1 In the event that
the test statistic is less than 0.5 for all k, , we maintain the estimated firm-
death date.  This procedure leads us to reclassify 26 percent of our estimated
firm deaths in France as false firm deaths.
Appendix Note
1. We nevertheless restart the seniority counter at zero the year following the false
firm death.  This is because the individuals moving to a new firm identifier in this
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448Table 5.B1 Type of Closures for France and Germany
Total
separations
Closure within 1 yr. Closure within 2 yr. Contraction by 40%
Country: year No. % No. % No. %
Francea
1984 8,309 2,498 30.06 2,821 33.95 n.d.b —
1985 8,620 3,159 36.65 3,487 40.45 n.d. —
1986 8,730 2,993 34.28 3,365 38.55 n.d. —
1987 10,517 3,072 29.21 3,633 34.54 n.d. —
1988 8,439 3,238 38.37 3,557 42.15 n.d. —
1989 15,459 5,622 36.37 6,349 41.07 n.d. —
Σ 60,074 20,582 34.26 23,212  38.64 n.d. —
Germany
1984 3,181 432 13.58 637 20.02 1,101 34.64
1985 2,777 423 15.23 625 22.50 1,097 39.50
1986 2,464 402 16.31 530 21.50 955 38.75
1987 2,030 323 15.91 460 22.66 774 38.12
1988 1,821 294 16.14 420 23.06 729 40.03
1989 2,117 263 12.42 375 17.71 755 35.66
1990 1,805 227 12.57 227 12.57  5.70 31.57
Σ 16,191 2,364 14.59 3,274 20.21 5,981  36.93
a For France, multiple observations in the same year are aggregated to the unique individual-year level.
b n.d. = no data available.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS and IAB data.
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Appendix C
Impact of Retirement Constraint in France
















Age at separation (years)
450 Bender, Dustmann, Margolis, and Meghir
451
Appendix D
Descriptive Statistics for France









Age 37.82 (6.93) 37.65 (7.20) 38.26 (7.37)
Log (average daily 
earnings)a
–1.65 (0.45) –1.81 (0.50) –1.73 (0.57)
4 ≤ Seniority < 6 0.17 0.22 0.26
6 ≤ Seniority < 8 0.23 0.25 0.26
8 ≤ Seniority <10 0.03 0.04 0.03




Elementary school 0.26 0.26 0.26
Junior high school 0.06 0.06 0.06
High school 0.04 0.04 0.04




Undergraduate university 0.04 0.04 0.04
Graduate school and 
grande  école
0.05 0.05 0.05
No. of obs. 54,918 16,876 27,685
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Table constructed with one observa-
tion per person per year.
a In thousands of 1980 francs.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
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Appendix E
Treatment of Censoring in Germany
Values for Germany appear in Table 5.E1.  There are 16,195 first separa-
tions between 1984 and 1990.  Of those, 4,242 do not return to the labor force
within the observation period, and 2,943 do not claim benefits.  In the subsam-
ple of workers who are displaced (according to definition 2 above), only 8 per-
cent do not claim benefits after separation and do not return into the sample.
Table 5.E1 Separation and Censoring in Germany
 Group  No.  Percent
First separations, 1984–90  16,195  100.00
Return to work  11,953  73.81
Do not return to work  4,242  26.19
Claim benefits  1,299  30.62
Do not claim benefits  2,943  69.38
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Appendix F
Descriptive Statistics for Germany








Age  39.42  (7.30)  39.10  (7.30)  37.59 (7.40)
Daily  wagea  85.01  (21.07)  77.15  (21.07)  83.15 (21.88)
Log of daily wage  4.41  (0.30)  4.30  (0.30)  4.38 (0.27)
4 ≤  Seniority < 6  15.89 —  18.74 —  26.52 —
6 ≤  Seniority < 8  13.79 —  17.24 —  17.47   —
8 ≤  Seniority < 10  25.76 —  29.13 —  25.23   —
10 ≤  Seniority  44.47 —  26.90 —  23.81   —
No apprentice, no high school  19.55 —  18.41 —  17.21   —
Apprentice, no high school  68.72 —  71.22 —  66.85  — 
No apprentice, high school  0.37 —  0.26 —  0.47   —
Apprentice, high school  1.05 —  0.96 —  1.44   —
Polytechnic  3.53 —  1.49 —  4.46   —
University  2.63 —  1.03 —  4.46   —
Education unknown  4.10 —  6.59 —  5.09   —
457
Plant size, 1982    3,086 (8,376)  160 (394 )  1,653 (5,003)
Plant size, 1982 (Median)       369 —  34 —  173 —  
Sector
1: Primary                  0.59 —  3.72 —  1.83 —  
2: Energy                   2.59 —  0.39 —  0.98 —  
3: Mining                   1.08 —  1.39 —  1.86 —  
4: Manufacturing            54.40 —  42.45 —  46.37 —  
5: Construction      7.95 —  21.41 —  11.60 —  
6: Distributional services  13.09 —  20.61 —  19.18 —  
7: Industry services        6.08 —  4.52 —  6.79 —  
8: Consumer services        1.24 —  1.03 —  1.38 —
9: Public services    12.93 —  4.42 —   9.97 —  
No. of obs.  32,235   3,003 10,266
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
a In German Marks (deflated to 1975 prices). 
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Appendix G
Probit Models for the Incidence of Displacement 
Using the Continuously Employed as the 
Reference Group in France
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Table 5.G1 Probit Models of Incidence of Separation by Type Relative to 
Continuously Employed in France in 1984 
Variable Displacements Other separations
Age –0.0104 (0.0145) –0.0090 (0.0113)
Age2/100 0.0184 (0.0188) 0.0165 (0.0145)
4 ≤  Seniority < 6       0.2268*** (0.0240) 0.3764*** (0.0181)
6 ≤  Seniority < 8       0.1453*** (0.0227) 0.1989*** (0.0177)
8 ≤  Seniority < 10      0.1529*** (0.0489) 0.0414 (0.0462)
Elementary school –0.1076 (0.0728) 0.0112 (0.0578)
Junior high school 0.0989 (0.1072) 0.0273 (0.0886)
High school 0.1504 (0.1303) 0.0940 (0.1076)
Basic vocational 
school
–0.1130 (0.0697) –0.1009* (0.0569)
Advanced vocational 
school
–0.2434* (0.1244) –0.0669 (0.0877)
Undergraduate 0.1933 (0.1216) 0.2030** (0.0940)
Graduate school and 
grande école
0.0065 (0.1165) 0.3766*** (0.0802)
Constant –2.0991*** (0.2920) –1.6256*** (0.2243)
No. of obs. 71,794 82,603
Log likelihood –11,264.46 –19,432.70
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates include data from 1984 only,
aggregated to one observation per individual.  All models also include controls for
sector (15 categories) and skill level (3 categories).  Reference groups: no educational
certification and 10 or more years of seniority.  Models estimate the probability of
specified type of separation relative to workers who were continuously employed
with the same firm throughout the sample window (1984–1989).  *** = Statistically
significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; * = statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
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Appendix H
Weibull Proportional Hazard Model for Germany
462Table 5.H1 Weibull Proportional Hazard Models for Germany  
Variable  All separations  Other separations Displacements
Age –3.2793***  (0.2255) –3.7131***  (0.2597) –1.9628***  (0.4639)
6 ≤   Seniority < 8        0.0248  (0.0570) 0.0228  (0.0641) 0.0664  (0.1284)
8 ≤  Seniority < 10       0.0633  (0.0531) 0.0293  (0.0602) 0.2250**  (0.1177)
10 ≤   Seniority           –0.0232  (0.0617 ) –0.1118  (0.0704) 0.3081***  (0.1321)
Displacement               0.4250***  (0.0387) — — — —
Apprentice, no high 
school
0.4008***  (0.0407) 0.4332***  (0.0468) 0.3000*** (0.0826)
No apprentice, high 
school
0.2073  (0.3041) 0.2422  (0.3367) 0.0591  (0.7156)
Apprentice, high 
school
0.0200  (0.1710) 0.3562 *  (0.1935) –0.7274**  (0.3639)
Polytechnic                0.2319*  (0.1309) 0.3627***  (0.1421) –0.2392  (0.3426)
University                 0.0909  (0.1276) 0.2074  (0.1302) –1.9875**  (1.0042)
Education
unknown
0.0522  (0.0721) 0.0748  (0.0842) –0.0251  (0.1404)
1985 0.1383***  (0.0485) 0.1707***  (0.0564) 0.0949  (0.0963)
1986 0.2598***  (0.0547) 0.2658***  (0.0626) 0.2745***  (0.1137)
1987 0.2319***  (0.0619) 0.3066***  (0.0706) 0.0180  (0.1302)
1988 0.2537***  (0.0694) 0.2971***  (0.0794) 0.1344  (0.1437)
1989 0.2703***  (0.0781) 0.3438***  (0.0879) 0.0447  (0.1732)
1990 0.0950  (0.1026) 0.0222 (0.1170) 0.7691***  (0.2106)
463




No. of obs. 5,019 3,998 1,021
No. of failures 3,720 2,813 907
Log likelihood –9666.48 –7531.57 –2087.78
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Right censoring occurs when the individual is not reemployed by December 1990.  *** = Sta-
tistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Appendix I
Estimates Comparing Different Definitions  
of Displacement for Germany
466Table 5.I1 Constrained Earnings Regressions for Germany: Displaced Workers
Variable  Within 1 year   Within 2 years 40 Shrinkage
Perma –0.2087*** (0.0220) –0.2161*** (0.0169) –0.2318*** (0.0123)
Sep1b –0.0233*** (0.0075) –0.0228*** (0.0062) –0.0331*** (0.0045)
Sep2 –0.0333*** (0.0083) –0.0291*** (0.0069) –0.0410*** (0.0050)
Sep3 –0.0353*** (0.0094) –0.0307*** (0.0078) –0.0435*** (0.0056)
Sep4 –0.0286*** (0.0106) –0.0189*** (0.0088) –0.0360*** (0.0063)
Sep5 –0.0339*** (0.0127) –0.0162 (0.0104) –0.0437*** (0.0075)
Sep6 –0.0499*** (0.0176) –0.0343** (0.0144) –0.0576*** (0.0105)
Age                         6.3572*** (0.3513) 6.1706*** (0.2909) 5.8927*** (0.2112)
Age2/100                   –7.1835*** (0.4260) –6.9319*** (0.3529) –6.4522*** (0.2561)
1985                        –0.0065 (0.0091) –0.0007 (0.0076) 0.0042 (0.0055)
1986                        0.0351*** (0.0093) 0.0389*** (0.0078) 0.0437*** (0.0056)
1987                        0.0720*** (0.0096) 0.0710*** (0.0081) 0.0769*** (0.0058)
1988                        0.1064*** (0.0100) 0.1065*** (0.0084) 0.1114*** (0.0060)
1989                        0.1183*** (0.0105) 0.1133*** (0.0088) 0.1204*** (0.0063)
1990                        0.1259*** (0.0114) 0.1167*** (0.0096) 0.1204*** (0.0068)
Apprentice, no 
high school
0.1816*** (0.0064) 0.1883*** (0.0052) 0.2041*** (0.0038)
No apprentice, 
high school




0.3247*** (0.0267) 0.3799*** (0 .0211) 0.4318*** (0.0147)
Polytechnic                 0.6629*** (0.0222) 0.6363*** (0.0181) 0.6263*** (0.0098)
University                  0.6635*** (0.0258) 0.6933*** (0.0216) 0.6787*** (0.0120)
Education
unknown
0.0952*** (0.0109) 0.0918 (0.0089) 0.1097*** (0.0065)
Constant                    2.8071*** (0.0709)  2.8521*** (0.0586) 2.9082*** (0.0427)
No. of obs.  15,346 21,519  39,669
Pseudo R2  0.2743 0.2980  0.3618
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Base education group = no apprentice, no high school degree.  *** = Statistically significant
at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level.
a Perm = 1 for observations after separation if time between the two jobs exceeded one year. 
b Sepi variables equal 1 in the ith year before or after separation. 
468
References
Abowd, John M., Francis Kramarz, Thomas Lemieux, and David N. Margolis.
2000.  “Minimum Wages and Youth Employment in France and the United
States.”  In Youth Employment and Joblessness in Advanced Countries,
David B. Blanchflower and Richard B. Freeman, eds.  Chicago: National
Bureau for Economic Research, pp. 427–472.
Abowd, John M., Francis Kramarz, David N. Margolis, and Thomas Philip-
pon.  2000.  Minimum Wages and Employment in France and the United
States.  Working paper, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique
and Laboratoire de Microeconomie Appliquée, Paris, France, August.
———.  1999.  “High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms.”  Econometrica
67(2): 251–333.
Abowd, John M., Hampton S.C. Finer, Francis Kramarz, and Sébastien Roux.
1997.  “Job and Wage Mobility: An Analysis of the Dynamics of Employ-
ment Durations Using Matched Employee and Employer Data from the
U.S. and France.”  Paper presented at NBER Summer Institute, Labor
Studies group, held July 21–25, Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
Bender, S., J. Hilzendegen, G. Rohwer, and H. Rudolph.  1996.  Die IAB-Bes-
chäftigtenstichprobe 1975–1990.  Beitrab, Nürnberg: Institut für Arbeits-
marktund Berufsforschung, p. 197.
Bonnal, Liliane, and Denis Fougère.  1993.  “Estimating the Structural Effect
of Unemployment Benefits on Job Search Costs.”  Working paper,
CREST.  
———.  1996.  “Estimating the Structural Effects of Unemployment Benefits
and the Minimum Wage Level on Unemployment Durations.”  Working
paper, CREST, July.  
Büchtemann, C.F.  1990.  “Kündigungsschutz als Beschäftigungshemmniss?”
Mitteilungen aus des Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 23: 394–410.
Bughin, Evelyne.  1985.  “La Négociation Salariale de Branche en 1984.”
Travail et Emploi 24(June): 51–59.
Buttler, F., W. Brandes, E. Dorndorf, W. Gaum, and U. Walwei.  1992.
“Flexibility and Job Security in the Federal Republic of Germany.”  Tech-
nical Report 1, Working paper, SAMF.  
Dustmann, Christian, and Arthur VanSoest.  1997.  “Wage Structures in the
Private and Public Sectors in West Germany.”  Fiscal Studies 18: 225–247.  
Fallick, Bruce C.  1996.  “A Review of the Recent Empirical Literature on
Displaced Workers.”  Industrial and Labor Relations Review 50(1): 5–16.
Farber, Henry S.  1977.  “The Changing Face of Job Loss in the United States,
1981–1995.” Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, pp. 129–142.
Worker Displacement in France and Germany 469
———.  1999.  “Alternative and Part-Time Employment Arrangements as a
Response to Job Loss.”  Working paper 7002, NBER, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts.
Gibbons, Robert, and Lawrence F. Katz.  1991.  “Layoffs and Lemons.”  Jour-
nal of Labor Economics 9(4): 351–380.
Herberger, L., and B. Becker.  1983.  “Sozialverischerungspflichtige Bes-
chäftigte.”  Der Beschäftigtenstatistik um im Mikrozensus, Wirtschaft und
Statistik, pp. 290–304.
Hunt, Jennifer.  1995.  “The Effect of Unemployment Compensation on
Unemployment Duration in Germany.”  Journal of Labor Economics
13(1): 88–120.
Jacobson, Louis S., Robert J. LaLonde, and Daniel G. Sullivan.  1993.  “Earn-
ings Losses of Displaced Workers.”  American Economic Review 83(4):
685–709.
Kittner, M.  1995.  Arbeits- und Sozialordnung.  Köln: Bund Verlag.  
Lefebvre, Francis.  1996.  Social 1996, Droit du Travail et Sécurité Sociale.
Mementos Pratiques, Levallois, France: Editions Francis Lefebvre.
Margolis, David N.  1993.  “Compensation Practices and Government Poli-
cies in Western European Labor Markets.”  Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell
University, Ithaca, New York.  
———.  1996.  “Cohort Effects and Returns to Seniority in France.”  Annales
d’Economie et de Statistique 41/42: 443–464.
———.  1999.  “Part-Year Employment, Slow Reemployment and Earnings
Losses: The Case of Worker Displacement in France.”  In The Creation
and Analysis of Linked Employer-Employee Data, James Spletzer, Jules
Theeuwes, John Haltiwanger, Julia Lane, and Kenneth Troske, eds.
Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 375–416.
———.  2000.  “Worker Displacement in France.”  Photocopy, Working
paper no. 2000-01, LAMIA and CREST, Paris, France.  
Rogowski, Ralf, and Klaus Schömann.  1996.  “Legal Regulation and Flexi-
bility of Employment Contracts.”  In International Handbook of Labour
Market Policy and Evaluation, Jacqueline O’Reilly, Gunther Schmid, and
Klaus Schömann, eds.  Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.  
Schmidt, Christoph M.  1994.  “Relative Wage Effects of German Unions.”
Working paper no. 918, CEPR.  
Seitchik, Adam.  1991.  “Who Are Displaced Workers?”  In Job Displace-
ment: Consequences and Implications for Policy, John T. Addison, ed.
Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press.  
Stevens, Ann Huff.  1997.  “Persistent Effects of Job Displacement: The
Importance of Multiple Job Losses.”  Journal of Labor Economics 15(1):
165–188.
470 Bender, Dustmann, Margolis, and Meghir
Swaim, Paul, and Michael Podgursky.  1991.  “Displacement and Unemploy-
ment.”  In Job Displacement: Consequences and Implications for Policy,
John T. Addison, ed.  Detroit: Wayne State University Press.  






W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Losing work, moving on : international perspectives on worker displacement / Peter J. 
Kuhn, editor.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-88099-233-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-88099-234-4 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Displaced workers—Case studies. 2. Unemployment—Case studies. 3.





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007–4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are
the sole responsibility of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent positions of
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by J.R. Underhill.
Index prepared by Leoni McVey.
Printed in the United States of America.
